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Abstract. Researchers have proposed formal definitions of quantitative
information flow based on information theoretic notions such as the Shan-
non entropy, the min entropy, the guessing entropy, belief, and channel
capacity. This paper investigates the hardness of precisely checking the
quantitative information flow of a program according to such definitions.
More precisely, we study the “bounding problem” of quantitative infor-
mation flow, defined as follows: Given a program M and a positive real
number q, decide if the quantitative information flow of M is less than
or equal to q. We prove that the bounding problem is not a k-safety
property for any k (even when q is fixed, for the Shannon-entropy-based
definition with the uniform distribution), and therefore is not amenable
to the self-composition technique that has been successfully applied to
checking non-interference. We also prove complexity theoretic hardness
results for the case when the program is restricted to loop-free boolean
programs. Specifically, we show that the problem is PP-hard for all defi-
nitions, showing a gap with non-interference which is coNP-complete for
the same class of programs. The paper also compares the results with
the recently proved results on the comparison problems of quantitative
information flow.
Keywords: security, quantitative information flow, program verification
1 Introduction
We consider programs containing high security inputs and low security outputs.
Informally, the quantitative information flow problem concerns the amount of
information that an attacker can learn about the high security input by executing
the program and observing the low security output. The problem is motivated
by applications in information security. We refer to the classic by Denning [12]
for an overview.
In essence, quantitative information flow measures how secure, or insecure,
a program (or a part of a program –e.g., a variable–) is. Thus, unlike non-
interference [10, 13], that only tells whether a program is completely secure or
⋆ This work was supported by MEXT KAKENHI 20700019, 20240001, and 22300005,
and Global COE Program “CERIES.”
not completely secure, a definition of quantitative information flow must be able
to distinguish two programs that are both interferent but have different degrees
of “secureness.”
For example, consider the following programs.
M1 ≡ if H = g then O := 0 else O := 1
M2 ≡ O := H
In both programs, H is a high security input and O is a low security output.
Viewing H as a password, M1 is a prototypical login program that checks if
the guess g matches the password.3 By executing M1, an attacker only learns
whether H is equal to g, whereas she would be able to learn the entire content of
H by executing M2. Hence, a reasonable definition of quantitative information
flow should assign a higher quantity toM2 than toM1, whereas non-interference
would merely say that M1 and M2 are both interferent, assuming that there are
more than one possible values of H .
Researchers have attempted to formalize the definition of quantitative infor-
mation flow by appealing to information theory. This has resulted in definitions
based on the Shannon entropy [12, 7, 19], the min entropy [28], the guessing en-
tropy [17, 1], belief [8], and channel capacity [22, 20, 26]. All of these definitions
map a program (or a part of a program) onto a non-negative real number, that
is, they define a function X such that given a program M , X (M) is a non-
negative real number. (Concretely, X is SE [µ] for the Shannon-entropy-based
definition with the distribution µ, ME [µ] for the min-entropy-based definition
with the distribution µ, GE [µ] for the guessing-entropy-based definition with the
distribution µ, and CC for the channel-capacity-based definition.4) Therefore, a
natural verification problem for quantitative information flow is to decide, given
M and a quantity q ≥ 0, if X (M) ≤ q. The problem is well-studied for the case
q = 0 as it is actually equivalent to checking non-interference (cf. Section 2.1).
The problem is open for q > 0 . We call this the bounding problem of quantitative
information flow.
The problem has a practical relevance as a user is often interested in know-
ing if her program leaks information within some allowed bound. That is, the
bounding problem is a form of quantitative information flow checking problem
(as opposed to inference). Much of the previous research has focused on infor-
mation theoretic properties of quantitative information flow and approximate
(i.e., incomplete and/or unsound) algorithms for checking and inferring quanti-
tative information flow. To fill the void, in a recent work [32], we have studied
the hardness and possibilities of deciding the comparison problem of quantitative
information flow, which is the problem of precisely checking if the information
flow of one program is larger than that of the other, that is, the problem of
deciding if X (M1) ≤ X (M2) given programs M1 and M2. The study has lead to
3 Here, for simplicity, we assume that g is a program constant. See Section 2 for
modeling attacker/user (i.e., low security) inputs.
4 The belief-based definition takes additional parameters as inputs, and is discussed
below.
some remarkable results, summarized in Section 3 and Section 4 of this paper
to contrast with the new results on the bounding problem. However, the hard-
ness results on the comparison problem do not imply hardness of the bounding
problem.5 Thus, this paper settles the open question.
We summarize the main results of the paper below. Here, X is SE [U ],ME [U ],
GE [U ] or CC , where U is the uniform distribution.
– Checking if X (M) ≤ q is not a k-safety property [29, 9] for any k.
– Restricted to loop-free boolean programs, checking if X (M) ≤ q is PP-hard.
Roughly, a verification problem being k-safety means that it can be reduced to
a standard safety problem, such as the unreachability problem, via self composi-
tion [3, 11]. For instance, non-interference is a 2-safety property (technically, for
the termination-insensitive case6), and this has enabled its precise checking via
a reduction to a safety problem via self composition and applying automated
safety verification techniques [29, 25, 31]. Also, our recent work [32] has shown
that deciding the comparison problem of quantitative information flow for all
distributions (i.e., checking if ∀µ.SE [µ](M1) ≤ SE [µ](M2), ∀µ.ME [µ](M1) ≤
ME [µ](M2), ∀µ.GE [µ](M1) ≤ GE [µ](M2), and ∀µ.∀h, ℓ.BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M1) ≤
BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M2)
7) are 2-safety problems (and in fact, all equivalent).
We also prove a complexity theoretic gap with these related problems. We
have shown in the previous paper [32] that, for loop-free boolean programs, both
checking non-interference and the above comparison problem with universally
quantified distributions are coNP-complete. (PP is believed to be strictly harder
than coNP. In particular, coNP = PP implies the collapse of the polynomial
hierarchy to level 1.)
Therefore, the results suggest that the bounding problems of quantitative in-
formation flow are harder than the related problems of checking non-interference
and the quantitative information flow comparison problems with universally
quantified distributions, and may require different techniques to solve (i.e., not
self composition).
The belief-based quantitative information flow [8] differs from the definitions
above in that it focuses on the information flow from a particular execution
of the program (called experiment) rather than the information flow from all
5 But, they imply the hardness of the inference problem because we can compare
X (M1) and X (M2) once we have computed them. We also note that the hardness
of the bounding problems implies that of the comparison problems because we can
reduce the bounding problem X (M) ≤ q to a comparison problem that compares
M with a program whose information flow is q. (But, the reverse direction does not
hold.)
6 We restrict to terminating programs in this paper. (The termination assumption is
nonrestrictive because we assume safety verification as a blackbox routine.)
7 See below for the notation BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) denoting the belief-based quantitative
information flow of M with respect to the experiment 〈µ, h, ℓ〉. The result for the
belief-based definition is proven in the extended version of the paper that is under
submission [33].
executions of the program.8 Therefore, we define and study the hardness of two
types of bounding problems for the belief-based definition:
(1) BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ q
(2) ∀h, ℓ.BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ q
Here, BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) denotes the belief-based information flow of M with the
experiment 〈µ, h, ℓ〉 where h, ℓ are the particular (high-security and low-security)
inputs. Note that the problem (2) checks the bound of the belief-based quanti-
tative information flow for all inputs whereas (1) checks the information flow for
a particular input. This paper proves that neither of these problems are k-safety
for any k, and are PP-hard for loop-free boolean programs.
We note that the above results are for the case the quantity q is taken to be
an input to the bounding problems. We show that when fixing the parameter
q constant, some of the problems become k-safety under certain conditions for
different k’s (cf. Section 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3).
We also define and study the hardness of the following bounding problems
that check the bound over all distributions.
(1) ∀µ.SE [µ](M) ≤ q
(2) ∀µ.ME [µ](M) ≤ q
(3) ∀µ.GE [µ](M) ≤ q
(4) ∀µ.BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ q
(5) ∀µ, h, ℓ.BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ q
We show that except for (4) and (5), these problems are also not k-safety for
any k, and are PP-hard for loop-free boolean programs, when q is not a constant
(but are k-safety for various k’s when q is held constant). For the problems (4)
and (5), we show that the problems are actually equivalent to that of checking
non-interference. (1), (2), and (3) are proven by showing that the problems corre-
spond to various “channel capacity like” definitions of quantitative information
flow.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing
information-theoretic definitions of quantitative information flow and formally
defines the bounding problems. Section 3 proves that the bounding problems are
not k-safety problems for SE [U ], ME [U ], GE [U ], and CC . (Section 3.1 shows
that when fixing the parameter q constant, some of them become k-safety under
certain conditions for different k’s.) Section 3.2 shows k-safety results for the
belief-based bounding problems, and Section 3.3 shows k-safety results for the
bounding problems that check the bound for all distributions. Section 4 proves
complexity theoretic hardness results for the bounding problems for loop-free
boolean programs for SE [U ], ME [U ], GE [U ], and CC , and Section 4.1 proves
those for the belief-based bounding problems and the bounding problems that
8 Clarkson et. al. [8] also propose a definition which averages the quantitative infor-
mation flow over a distribution of the inputs h and ℓ. Note that a hardness result
for (1) below implies the hardness result of the bounding problem for this problem
as we may take the distribution to be a point mass.
check the bound for all distributions. Section 5 discusses some implications of
the hardness results. Section 6 discusses related work, and Section 7 concludes.
All the proofs appear in Appendix A.
2 Preliminaries
We introduce the information theoretic definitions of quantitative information
flow that have been proposed in literature. First, we review the notion of the
Shannon entropy [27], H[µ](X), which is the average of the information content,
and intuitively, denotes the uncertainty of the random variable X .
Definition 1 (Shannon Entropy). Let X be a random variable with sam-
ple space X and µ be a probability distribution associated with X. (We write µ
explicitly for clarity.) The Shannon entropy of X is defined as
H[µ](X) =
∑
x∈X
µ(X = x) log
1
µ(X = x)
(The logarithm is in base 2.)
Next, we define conditional entropy. Informally, the conditional entropy of X
given Y denotes the uncertainty of X after knowing Y .
Definition 2 (Conditional Entropy). Let X and Y be random variables with
sample spaces X and Y, respectively, and µ be a probability distribution associated
with X and Y . Then, the conditional entropy of X given Y , written H[µ](X |Y )
is defined as
H[µ](X |Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
µ(Y = y)H[µ](X |Y = y)
where
H[µ](X |Y = y) =
∑
x∈X µ(X = x|Y = y) log
1
µ(X=x|Y=y)
µ(X = x|Y = y) = µ(X=x,Y=y)
µ(Y=y)
Next, we define (conditional) mutual information. Intuitively, the conditional
mutual information of X and Y given Z represents the mutual dependence of
X and Y after knowing Z.
Definition 3 (Mutual Information). Let X,Y and Z be random variables
and µ be an associated probability distribution.9 Then, the conditional mutual
information of X and Y given Z is defined as
I[µ](X ;Y |Z) = H[µ](X |Z)−H[µ](X |Y, Z)
= H[µ](Y |Z)−H[µ](Y |X,Z)
9 We abbreviate the sample spaces of random variables when they are clear from the
context.
Let M be a program that takes a high security input H and a low security
input L, and gives the low security output O. For simplicity, we restrict to
programs with just one variable of each kind, but it is trivial to extend the
formalism to multiple variables (e.g., by letting the variables range over tuples).
Also, for the purpose of the paper, unobservable (i.e., high security) outputs are
irrelevant, and so we assume that the only program output is the low security
output. Let µ be a probability distribution over the values of H and L. Then,
the semantics of M can be defined by the following probability equation. (We
restrict to terminating deterministic programs in this paper.)
µ(O = o) =
∑
h, ℓ ∈ H,L
M(h, ℓ) = o
µ(H = h, L = ℓ)
Note that we write M(h, ℓ) to denote the low security output of the program
M given inputs h and ℓ. Now, we are ready to introduce the Shannon-entropy
based definition of quantitative information flow (QIF) [12, 7, 19].
Definition 4 (Shannon-Entropy-based QIF). Let M be a program with a
high security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O. Let
µ be a distribution over H and L. Then, the Shannon-entropy-based quantitative
information flow is defined
SE [µ](M) = I[µ](O;H |L)
= H[µ](H |L)−H[µ](H |O,L)
Intuitively, H[µ](H |L) denotes the initial uncertainty knowing the low security
input and H[µ](H |O,L) denotes the remaining uncertainty after knowing the
low security output.
As an example, consider the programs M1 and M2 from Section 1. For
concreteness, assume that g is the value 01 and H ranges over the space
{00, 01, 10, 11}. Let U be the uniform distribution over {00, 01, 10, 11}, that is,
U(h) = 1/4 for all h ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}. Computing their Shannon-entropy based
quantitative information flow, we have,
SE [U ](M1) = H[U ](H)−H[U ](H |O) = log 4−
3
4 log 3 ≈ .81128
SE [U ](M2) = H[U ](H)−H[U ](H |O) = log 4− log 1 = 2
Hence, if the user was to ask if SE [U ](M1) ≤ 1.0, that is, “does M1 leak more
than one bit of information (according to SE [U ])?”, then the answer would be
no. But, for the same query, the answer would be yes for M2.
Next, we introduce the min entropy, which Smith [28] recently suggested as
an alternative measure for quantitative information flow.
Definition 5 (Min Entropy). Let X and Y be random variables, and µ be an
associated probability distribution. Then, the min entropy of X is defined
H∞[µ](X) = log
1
V [µ](X)
and the conditional min entropy of X given Y is defined
H∞[µ](X |Y ) = log
1
V [µ](X |Y )
where
V [µ](X) = maxx∈X µ(X = x)
V [µ](X |Y = y) = maxx∈X µ(X = x|Y = y)
V [µ](X |Y ) =
∑
y∈Y µ(Y = y)V [µ](X |Y = y)
Intuitively, V [µ](X) represents the highest probability that an attacker
guesses X in a single try. We now define the min-entropy-based definition of
quantitative information flow.
Definition 6 (Min-Entropy-based QIF). Let M be a program with a high
security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O. Let µ be a
distribution over H and L. Then, the min-entropy-based quantitative information
flow is defined
ME [µ](M) = H∞[µ](H |L)−H∞[µ](H |O,L)
Whereas Smith [28] focused on programs lacking low security inputs, we
extend the definition to programs with low security inputs in the definition
above. It is easy to see that our definition coincides with Smith’s for programs
without low security inputs. Also, the extension is arguably natural in the sense
that we simply take the conditional entropy with respect to the distribution over
the low security inputs.
Computing the min-entropy based quantitative information flow for our run-
ning example programsM1 andM2 from Section 1 with the uniform distribution,
we obtain,
ME [U ](M1) = H∞[U ](H)−H∞[U ](H |O) = log 4− log 2 = 1
ME [U ](M2) = H∞[U ](H)−H∞[U ](H |O) = log 4− log 1 = 2
Hence, if a user is to check whether ME [U ] is bounded by q for 1 ≤ q < 2, then
the answer would be yes for M1, but no for M2.
Next, we introduce the guessing-entropy based definition of quantitative in-
formation flow [21, 17, 1].
Definition 7 (Guessing Entropy). Let X and Y be random variables, and
µ be an associated probability distribution. Then, the guessing entropy of X is
defined
G[µ](X) =
∑
1≤i≤m
i× µ(X = xi)
where m = |X| and x1, x2, . . . , xm satisfies ∀i, j.i ≤ j ⇒ µ(X = xi) ≥ µ(X =
xj).
The conditional guessing entropy of X given Y is defined
G[µ](X |Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
µ(Y = y)G[µ](X |Y = y)
where
G[µ](X |Y = y) =
∑
1≤i≤m i× µ(X = xi|Y = y)
m = |X| and ∀i, j.i ≤ j ⇒ µ(X = xi|Y = y) ≥ µ(X = xj |Y = y)
Intuitively, G[µ](X) represents the average number of times required for the
attacker to guess the value of X . We now define the guessing-entropy-based
quantitative information flow.
Definition 8 (Guessing-Entropy-based QIF). Let M be a program with a
high security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O. Let
µ be a distribution over H and L. Then, the guessing-entropy-based quantitative
information flow is defined
GE [µ](M) = G[µ](H |L)− G[µ](H |O,L)
Like with the min-entropy-based definition, the previous research on
guessing-entropy-based quantitative information flow only considered programs
without low security inputs [17, 1]. But, it is easy to see that our definition with
low security inputs coincides with the previous definitions for programs with-
out low security inputs. Also, as with the extension for the min-entropy-based
definition, it simply takes the conditional entropy over the low security inputs.
We test GE on the running example from Section 1 by calculating the quan-
tities for the programs M1 and M2 with the uniform distribution.
GE [U ](M1) = G[U ](H)− G[U ](H |O) =
5
2 −
7
4 = 0.75
GE [U ](M2) = G[U ](H)− G[U ](H |O) =
5
2 − 1 = 1.5
Hence, if a user is to check whether GE [U ] is bounded by q for 0.75 ≤ q < 1.5,
then the answer would be yes for M1, but no for M2.
Next, we introduce the belief-based definition of quantitative information
flow [8]. The belief-based definition computes the information leak from a single
execution of the program, called an experiment.
Definition 9 (Experiment). Let µ be a distribution over a high-security input
such that ∀h.µ(h) > 0, hE be a high-security input, and ℓE be a low-security input.
Then, the experiment E is defined to be the tuple 〈µ, hE , ℓE〉.
10
Intuitively, the distribution µ represents the attacker’s belief about the user’s high
security input selection, ℓE denotes the attacker’s low-security input selection,
and hE denotes the user’s actual selection. Then, the belief-based quantitative
information flow, which is the information flow of individual experiments, is
defined as follows.
10 Clarkson et. al. [8] also include the output and the program itself as part of the
experiment. In this paper, an experiment consists solely of the input and the distri-
bution.
Definition 10 (Belief-based QIF). Let M be a program with a high security
input, a low security input, and a low security output. Let E be an experiment
such that E = 〈µ, hE , ℓE〉. Then, the belief-based quantitative information flow is
defined
BE [E ](M) = D(µ→ h˙E)−D(µ|oE → h˙E)
where
oE =M(hE , ℓE)
h˙ = λh′.if h = h′ then 1 else 0
µℓE (oE) =
∑
h∈{h′|M(h′,ℓE)=oE}
µ(h)
µ|oE = λh.if M(h, ℓE) = oE then
µ(h)
µℓE (oE)
else 0
D(µ→ µ′) =
∑
h µ
′(h) log µ
′(h)
µ(h)
Here, D(µ → µ′) is the relative entropy (or, distance) of µ and µ′, and quan-
tifies the difference between the two distributions.11 Note that h˙ denotes the
point mass distribution at h. Intuitively, the belief-based quantitative informa-
tion flow expresses the difference between the attacker’s belief about the high
security input and the output of the experiment. It can be shown that BE [E ](M)
is equivalent to self-information (for M deterministic), that is, the negative log-
arithm of the probability the event occurs (i.e., in this case, the output occurs).
Lemma 1. Let µ be a belief, hE be a high-security input, ℓE be a low-security
input. Then, BE [〈µ, hE , ℓE〉](M) = − logΣh∈{h′|M(h′,ℓE)=M(hE ,ℓE)}µ(h).
Computing the belief-based quantitative information flow for our running
example programsM1 and M2 from Section 1 with the uniform distribution, we
obtain,
– h ∈ {00, 10, 11}
BE [〈U, h〉](M1) = − logU(M1(h)) = − log
3
4
≈ .41503
– h = 01
BE [〈U, h〉](M1) = − logU(M1(h)) = − log
1
4
= 2
And, for any h ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11},
BE [〈U, h〉](M2) = − logU(M2(h)) = − log
1
4
= 2
Therefore, if the user was to ask if BE [〈U, h〉] is bounded by 1.0 for h = 00, then
the answer would be yes for M1 but no for M2. But, if the user was to ask if
BE [〈U, h〉] is bounded by 1.0 for all h, then the answer would be no for both M1
and M2.
Finally, we introduce the definition of quantitative information flow based
on channel capacity [22, 20, 26], which is defined to be the maximum of the
Shannon-entropy based quantitative information flow over the distribution.
11 Here, we follow [8] and use the notation D(µ→ µ′) over the more standard notation
D(µ′||µ).
Definition 11 (Channel-Capacity-based QIF). Let M be a program with
a high security input H, a low security input L, and a low security output O.
Then, the channel-capacity-based quantitative information flow is defined
CC (M) = max
µ
I[µ](O;H |L)
Unlike the other definitions above, the channel-capacity based definition of
quantitative information flow is not parameterized by the distribution over the
inputs. As with the other definitions, let us test the definition on the running
example from Section 1 by calculating the quantities for the programs M1 and
M2:
CC (M1) = maxµ I[µ](O;H) = 1
CC (M2) = maxµ I[µ](O;H) = 2
Note that CC (M1) (resp. CC (M2)) is equal to ME [U ](M1) (resp. ME [U ](M2)).
This is not a coincidence. In fact, it is known that CC (M) = ME [U ](M) for all
programs M without low security inputs [28].
2.1 Non-interference
We recall the notion of non-interference [10, 13].
Definition 12 (Non-intereference). A programM is said to be non-interferent
iff for any h, h′ ∈ H and ℓ ∈ L, M(h, ℓ) =M(h′, ℓ).
It can be shown that for the definitions of quantitative information flow X
introduced above, X (M) ≤ 0 iff M is non-interferent.12 That is, the bounding
problem (which we only officially define for positive bounds –see Section 2.2–)
degenerates to checking non-interference when 0 is given as the bound.
Theorem 1. Let µ be a distribution such that ∀h ∈ H, ℓ ∈ L.µ(h, ℓ) > 0. Then,
– M is non-interferent if and only if SE [µ](M) ≤ 0.
– M is non-interferent if and only if ME [µ](M) ≤ 0.
– M is non-interferent if and only if GE [µ](M) ≤ 0.
– M is non-interferent if and only if BE [〈µ′, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ 0.13
– M is non-interferent if and only if CC (M) ≤ 0.
The equivalence result on the Shannon-entropy-based definition is proven by
Clark et al. [6]. The proofs for the other four definitions are given in Appendix A.
12 Technically, we need the non-zero-ness condition on the distribution. (See below.)
13 Recall Definition 10 that µ′ is a distribution over H such that µ′(h) > 0 for all h ∈ H.
2.2 Bounding Problem
We define the bounding problem of quantitative information flow for each defi-
nition introduced above. The bounding problem for the Shannon-entropy based
definition BSE [µ] is defined as follows: Given a program M and a positive real
number q, decide if SE [µ](M) ≤ q.14 Similarly, we define the bounding problems
for the other three definitions BME [µ], BGE [µ], and BCC as follows.
BME [µ] = {(M, q) | ME [µ](M) ≤ q}
BGE [µ] = {(M, q) | GE [µ](M) ≤ q}
BCC = {(M, q) | CC (M) ≤ q}
We defer the definitions of the belief-based bounding problems to Section 3.2.
3 K-Safety Property
We show that none of the bounding problems are k-safety problems for any k.
Informally, a program property is said to be a k-safety property [29, 9] if it can be
refuted by observing k number of (finite) execution traces. A k-safety problem
is the problem of checking a k-safety property. Note that the standard safety
property is a 1-safety property. An important property of a k-safety problem is
that it can be reduced to a standard safety (i.e., 1-safety) problem, such as the
unreachability problem, via a simple program transformation called self compo-
sition [3, 11]. This allows one to verify k-safety problems by applying powerful
automated safety verification techniques [2, 14, 24, 4] that have made remarkable
progress recently.
As stated earlier, we prove that no bounding problem is a k-safety property
for any k. (First, we prove the result for SE, ME, GE, and CC, and defer the
result for BE to Section 3.2.) To put the result in perspective, we compare it
to the results of the related problems, summarized below. Here, X is SE [U ],
ME [U ], GE [U ], or CC , and Y is SE , ME , or GE . (Recall that U denotes the
uniform distribution.)
(1) Checking non-interference is a 2-safety problem, but it is not 1-safety.
(2) Checking X (M1) ≤ X (M2) is not a k-safety problem for any k.
(3) Checking ∀µ.Y[µ](M1) ≤ Y[µ](M2) is a 2-safety problem.
The result (1) on non-interference is classic (see, e.g., [23, 3, 11]). The results
(2) and (3) on comparison problems are proven in our recent paper [32]. There-
fore, this section’s results imply that the bounding problems are harder to ver-
ify (at least, via the self-composition approach) than non-interference and the
quantitative information flow comparison problems with universally quantified
distributions.
Let Prog be the set of all programs, and R+ be the set of positive real
numbers. Let [[M ]] denote the semantics (i.e., traces) of M , represented by the
14 Note that we treat µ as a parameter of the bounding problem rather than as an
input.
set of input/output pairs, that is, [[M ]] = {((h, ℓ), o) | h ∈ H, ℓ ∈ L, o =M(h, ℓ)}.
Then, formally, k-safety property is defined as follows.
Definition 13 (k-safety property). We say that a property P ⊆ Prog × R+
is a k-safety property iff (M, q) 6∈ P implies that there exists T ⊆ [[M ]] such that
|T | ≤ k and ∀M ′.T ⊆ [[M ′]]⇒ (M ′, q) 6∈ P .
Note that the original definition of k-safety property is only defined over pro-
grams [29, 9]. However, because the bounding problems take the additional input
q, we extend the notion to account for the extra parameter.
We now state the main results of this section which show that none of the
bounding problems are k-safety problems for any k. Because we are interested in
hardness, we focus on the case where the distribution is the uniform distribution.
That is, the results we prove for the specific case applies to the general case.
Theorem 2. Neither BSE [U ], BME [U ], BGE [U ], nor BCC is a k-safety property
for any k such that k > 0.
The result follows from the fact that for each of bounding problem BX above, for
any k, there exists q such that deciding (M, q) ∈ BX is not a k-safety property.
In fact, as we show next, for some of the problems such as BSE [U ], even if we fix
q to an arbitrary constant, there exists no k such that the problem is k-safety.
(But for other problems, for certain cases, we can find k that depends on q.) We
defer the details to the next section. (See also Section 5.2.)
3.1 K-Safety Under a Constant Bound
The result above appears to suggest that the bounding problems are equally
difficult for SE [U ], ME [U ], GE [U ], and CC. However, holding the parameter q
constant (rather than having it as an input) paints a different picture. We show
that the problems become k-safety for different definitions for different k’s under
different conditions in this case.
First, for q fixed, we show that the bounding problem for the channel-capacity
based definition of quantitative information flow is k-safety for k = ⌊2q⌋ + 1.
(Also, this bound is tight.)
Theorem 3. Let q be a constant. Then, BCC is ⌊2
q⌋ + 1-safety, but it is not
k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2q⌋.
We briefly explain the intuition behind the above result. Recall that a prob-
lem being k-safety means the existence of a counterexample trace set of size at
most k. That is, for (M, q) /∈ BCC , we have T ⊆ [[M ]] such that |T | ≤ ⌊2
q⌋+ 1
such that any program that also contains T as its traces also does not belong to
BCC (with q), that is, its channel-capacity-based quantitative information flow
is greater than q. Then, the above result follows from the fact that the channel-
capacity-based quantitative information flow coincides with the maximum over
the low security inputs of the logarithm of the number of outputs [20], therefore,
any T containing ⌊2q⌋ + 1 traces of the same low security input and disjoint
outputs is a counterexample.
For concreteness, we show how to check BCC via self composition. Suppose
we are given a programM and a positive real q. We construct the self-composed
program M ′ shown below.
M ′(H1, H2, . . . , Hn, L) ≡
O1 :=M(H1, L);O2 :=M(H2, L); . . . ;On :=M(Hn, L);
assert(
∨
i,j∈{1,...,n}(Oi = Oj ∧ i 6= j))
where n = ⌊2q⌋+ 1. In general, a self composition involves making k copies the
original program so that the resulting program would generate k traces of the
original (having the desired property). By the result proven by Malacaria and
Chen [20](see also Lemma 7), it follows that M ′ does not cause an assertion
failure iff (M, q) ∈ BCC .
Next, we show that for programs without low security inputs, BME [U ] and
BGE [U ] are also both k-safety problems (but for different k’s) when q is held
constant.
Theorem 4. Let q be a constant, and suppose BME [U ] only takes programs
without low security inputs. Then, BME [U ] is ⌊2
q⌋ + 1-safety, but it is not k-
safety for any k ≤ ⌊2q⌋.
Theorem 5. Let q be a constant, and suppose BGE [U ] only takes programs
without low security inputs. If q ≥ 12 , then, BGE [U ] is ⌊
(⌊q⌋+1)2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋ + 1-safety,
but it is not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋. Otherwise, q <
1
2 and BGE [U ] is
2-safety, but it is not 1-safety.
The result for ME [U ] follows from the fact that for programs without low
security inputs, the min-entropy based quantitative information flow with the
uniform distribution is actually equivalent to the channel-capacity based quanti-
tative information flow [28]. The result for GE [U ] may appear less intuitive, but,
the key observation is that, like the channel-capacity based definition and the
min-entropy based definition with the uniform distribution (for the case without
low security inputs), for any set of traces T = [[M ]], the information flow of a
program containing T would be at least as large as that ofM . Therefore, by hold-
ing q constant, we can always find a large enough counterexample T . The reason
BGE [U ] is 2-safety for q <
1
2 is because, in the absence of low security inputs,
the minimum non-zero quantity of GE [U ](M) is bounded (by 1/2), and so for
such q, the problem GE [U ](M) ≤ q is equivalent to checking non-interference.15
But, when low security inputs are allowed, neither BME [U ] nor BGE [U ] are
k-safety for any k, even when q is held constant.
Theorem 6. Let q be a constant. (And let BME [U ] take programs with low
security inputs.) Then, BME [U ] is not a k-safety property for any k > 0.
15 In fact, the minimum non-zero quantity property also exists for ME[U] without low
security inputs and CC. There, the minimum non-zero quantity is 1, which agrees
with the formulas given in the theorems.
Theorem 7. Let q be a constant. (And let BGE [U ] take programs with low se-
curity inputs.) Then, BGE [U ] is not a k-safety property for any k > 0.
Finally, we show that the Shannon-entropy based definition (with the uniform
distribution) is the hardest of all the definitions and show that its bounding
problem is not a k-safety property for any k, with or without low-security inputs,
even when q is held constant.
Theorem 8. Let q be a constant, and suppose BSE [U ] only takes programs with-
out low security inputs. Then, BSE [U ] is not a k-safety property for any k > 0.
Intuitively, Theorems 6, 7, and 8 follow from the fact that, for these defini-
tions, given any potential counterexample T ⊆ [[M ]] to show (M, q) /∈ BX , it is
possible to find M ′ containing T whose information flow is arbitrarily close to 0
(and so (M ′, q) ∈ BX ). See Section 5.2 for further discussion.
Because k tends to grow large as q grows for all the definitions and it is
impossible to bound k for all q, this section’s results are unlikely to lead to a
practical verification of quantitative information flow. 16 Nevertheless, the results
reveal interesting disparities among the different proposals for the definition of
quantitative information flow.
3.2 K-Safety for Belief-based Definition
This section investigates the hardness of the bounding problems for the belief-
based definition of quantitative information flow. We define two types of bound-
ing problems.
BBE1 [〈µ, h, ℓ〉] = {(M, q) | BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ q}
BBE2 [µ] = {(M, q) | ∀h, ℓ.BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ q}
BBE1 checks the program’s information flow against the given quantity for a
specific input pair h, ℓ whereas BBE2 checks that for all inputs.
We show that these problems are not a k-safety problems for any k, at least
when q is not a constant. To put the result in perspective, we compare to the
results of the comparison problem for the belief-based quantitative information
flow problem [33].
(1) Checking BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M1) ≤ BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M2) is not a k-safety problem
for any k.
(2) Checking ∀h, ℓ.BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M1) ≤ BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M2) is not a k-safety prob-
lem for any k.
(3) Checking ∀µ, h, ℓ.BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M1) ≤ BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M2) is a 2-safety prob-
lem.
Note that the problem in (3) compares the two programs for all experiments
〈µ, h, ℓ〉. This problem also turns out to be equivalent to the comparison prob-
lems with universally quantified distributions for SE, ME, and GE discussed
16 But, a recent work [16] shows some promising results.
in Section 3. Hence, this section’s non-k-safety results show that the bounding
problems BBE1 and BBE2 are harder to verify (at least, via the self-composition
approach) than non-interference and the comparison problems with universally
quantified distributions and experiments.
First, we show that BBE1 [〈U, h, ℓ〉] is not a k-safety property for any k, even
when q is held constant, and even without low security inputs.
Theorem 9. Let q be a constant, and suppose BBE1 [〈U, h〉] only takes programs
without low security inputs. Then, BBE1 [〈U, h〉] is not a k-safety property for any
k > 0.
Next, we show that BBE2 [U ] is also not a k-safety property for any k when q
is a constant and q ≥ 1, even without low security inputs. But, when q is held
constant and q < 1, BBE2 [U ] is a 2-safety property.
Theorem 10. Let q be a constant. If q ≥ 1, then BBE2 [U ] is not a k-safety
property for any k > 0 even when BBE2 [U ] only takes programs without low
security inputs. Otherwise, q < 1 and BBE2 [U ] is a 2-safety property, but it is
not a 1-safety property.
The 2-safety property for the case q < 1 follows because BBE2 [U ] turns out to
be equivalent to non-interference for such q. The results show that the bounding
problems for the belief-based definition is also quite hard, except for the case
where one checks if the information flow is less than 1 for all inputs, which
degenerates to checking non-interference.
3.3 K-Safety for Channel Capacity Like Definitions
In this section, we study the hardness of the bounding problems that check the
bound for all distributions. We define the following problems.
BSECC = {(M, q) | ∀µ.SE [µ](M) ≤ q}
BMECC = {(M, q) | ∀µ.ME [µ](M) ≤ q}
BGECC = {(M, q) | ∀µ.GE [µ](M) ≤ q}
BBE1CC [h, ℓ] = {(M, q) | ∀µ.BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ q}
BBE2CC = {(M, q) | ∀µ.∀h, ℓ.BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ q}
Note that BSECC = BCC because CC (M) = maxµ SE [µ](M). For this reason,
we call these bounding problems “channel capacity like.” For instance, Ko¨pf and
Smith [18] call maxµME [µ](M) the min-entropy channel capacity. (Note that
(M, q) ∈ BMECC iff maxµME [µ](M) ≤ q.) BGECC follows the same spirit. We
define two types of channel-capacity like problems for the belief-based definition
corresponding to the two types of bounding problems BBE1 and BBE2 .
We prove k-safety results for each of these problems. The result below for
BSECC follows directly from that of BCC (i.e., Theorem 3). But, the other results
proved are new.
Theorem 11. Let q be a constant. Then, BSECC is ⌊2
q⌋+1-safety, but it is not
k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2q⌋.
First, we show that BMECC enjoys the same property as BSECC . That is,
when q is held constant, it is ⌊2q⌋ + 1-safety, but it is not k-safety for any k ≤
⌊2q⌋. Note that unlike BME [U ], this holds even for programs with low security
inputs. We show this by proving the following lemma stating that maxµME [µ]
is actually equivalent to CC (M).
Lemma 2. maxµME [µ](M) = CC (M)
The lemma extends the result by Braun et al. [5] that shows the equivalence for
the low-security-input-free case. By the lemma, the k-safety result for BMECC
follows directly from that of BCC .
Theorem 12. Let q be a constant. Then, BMECC is ⌊2
q⌋ + 1-safety, but it is
not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2q⌋.
Next, we prove that, when q is held constant, BGECC is k-safety for k =
⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋ + 1 when q ≥
1
2 and is 2-safety for q <
1
2 . Recall that these k-
safety bounds are equivalent to those of BGE [U ] without low security inputs
(cf. Theorem 5). However, unlike BGE [U ], the k-safety result here holds even for
programs with low security inputs.
Theorem 13. Let q be a constant. If q ≥ 12 , then, BGECC is ⌊
(⌊q⌋+1)2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋ + 1-
safety, but it is not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋. Otherwise, q <
1
2 and
BGECC is 2-safety, but it is not 1-safety.
The above is shown by proving the following lemma which states that
the “guessing entropy channel capacity” maxµGE [µ] is actually equivalent to
maxℓGE [U ⊗ ℓ˙]. (See below for the definition of U ⊗ ℓ˙.)
Lemma 3. We have maxµGE [µ](M) = maxℓ′ GE [U ⊗ ℓ˙′](M) where U ⊗ ℓ˙′
denotes λh, ℓ.if ℓ = ℓ′ then U(h) else 0.
Finally, we prove somewhat surprising results for BBE1CC [h, ℓ] and BBE2CC
stating that they are in fact equivalent to non-interference, independent of q. It
follows that these problems are 2-safety but not 1-safety.
Theorem 14. (M, q) ∈ BBE1CC [h, ℓ] iff M(ℓ) is non-interferent.
Here, M(ℓ) = λh.M(h, ℓ). That is, the theorem states that, for any q, (M, q) ∈
BBE1CC [h, ℓ] iff the program M restricted to the low security input ℓ is non-
interferent. (Note that checking non-interference at a fixed low security input is
also a 2-safety property and is not a 1-safety property.)
An analogous result holds for BBE2CC .
Theorem 15. (M, q) ∈ BBE2CC iff M is non-interferent.
Clarkson et al. [9] also studies BBE2CC , which they call QL in their paper.
17
They state that the problem is a hypersafety property, which is a superset of
k-safety properties.18
17 Technically, they allow an experiment to consist of a sequence of runs of the program
whereas we restrict an experiment to a single run.
18 Informally, a property is a hypersafety if there exists a counterexample set of traces
of any size.
M ::= x := ψ |M0;M1
| if ψ then M0 elseM1
φ, ψ ::= true | x | φ ∧ ψ | ¬φ
Fig. 1. The syntax of loop-free boolean programs
4 Complexities for Loop-free Boolean Programs
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity of the bounding prob-
lems when the programs are restricted to loop-free boolean programs. We com-
pare the complexity theoretic hardness of the bounding problems with those of
the related problems for the same class of programs, as we have done with the
k-safety property of the problems.
That is, we compare against the comparison problems of quantitative infor-
mation flow and the problem of checking non-interference for loop-free boolean
programs. The complexity results for these problems are summarized below.
Here, X is SE [U ], ME [U ], GE [U ], or CC , and Y is SE , ME , or GE .
(1) Checking non-interference is coNP-complete
(2) Checking X (M1) ≤ X (M2) is PP-hard.
(3) Checking ∀µ.Y[µ](M1) ≤ Y[µ](M2) is coNP-complete.
The results (1) and (3) are proven in our recent paper [32]. The result (2) is
proven in the extended version of the paper [33] and tightens our (oracle relative)
#P-hardness result from the conference version [32], which states that for each
C such that C is the comparison problem for SE [U ], ME [U ], GE [U ], or CC , we
have #P ⊆ FPC . (Recall that the notation FPA means the complexity class of
function problems solvable in polynomial time with an oracle for the problem
A.) #P is the class of counting problems associated with NP. PP is the class
of decision problems solvable in probabilistic polynomial time. PP is known to
contain both coNP and NP, PH ⊆ PPP = P#P [30], and PP is believed to be
strictly larger than both coNP and NP. (In particular, PP = coNP would imply
the collapse of the polynomial hierarchy (PH) to level 1.)
We show that, restricted to loop-free boolean programs, the bounding prob-
lems for the Shannon-entropy-based, the min-entropy-based, and the guessing-
entropy-based definition of quantitative information flow with the uniform dis-
tribution (i.e., SE [U ], ME [U ], and GE [U ]) and the channel-capacity based def-
inition (i.e., CC ) are all PP-hard. (The results for the belief-based definition
and the channel-capacity-like definitions appear in Section 4.1.) The results
strengthen the hypothesis that the bounding problems for these definitions are
quite hard. Indeed, they show that they are complexity theoretically harder
than non-interference and the comparison problems with the universally quan-
tified distributions for loop-free boolean programs, assuming that coNP and PP
are separate.
wp(x := ψ, φ) = φ[ψ/x]
wp(if ψ then M0 elseM1, φ)
= (ψ ⇒ wp(M0, φ)) ∧ (¬ψ ⇒ wp(M1, φ))
wp(M0;M1, φ) = wp(M0,wp(M1, φ))
Fig. 2. The weakest precondition for loop-free boolean programs
We define the syntax of loop-free boolean programs in Figure 1. We assume
the usual derived formulas φ ⇒ ψ, φ = ψ, φ ∨ ψ, and false. We give the usual
weakest precondition semantics in Figure 2.
To adapt the information flow framework to boolean programs, we make each
information flow variable H , L, and O range over functions mapping boolean
variables of its kind to boolean values. For example, if x and y are low security
boolean variables and z is a high security boolean variable, then L ranges over the
functions {x, y} → {false, true}, and H and O range over {z} → {false, true}.19
(Every boolean variable is either a low security boolean variable or a high security
boolean variable.) We write M(h, ℓ) = o for an input (h, ℓ) and an output o if
(h, ℓ) |= wp(M,φ) for a boolean formula φ such that o |= φ and o′ 6|= φ for all
output o′ 6= o. Here, |= is the usual logical satisfaction relation, using h, ℓ, o,
etc. to look up the values of the boolean variables. (Note that this incurs two
levels of lookup.)
As an example, consider the following program.
M ≡ z := x;w := y; if x ∧ y then z := ¬z else w := ¬w
Let x, y be high security variables and z, w be low security variables. Then,
SE [U ](M) = 1.5
ME [U ](M) = log 3 ≈ 1.5849625
GE [U ](M) = 1.25
CC (M) = log 3 ≈ 1.5849625
We now state the main results of the section, which show that the bounding
problems for SE [U ], ME [U ], GE [U ], and CC are PP-hard.
Theorem 16. PP ⊆ BSE [U ]
Theorem 17. PP ⊆ BME [U ]
Theorem 18. PP ⊆ BGE [U ]
Theorem 19. PP ⊆ BCC
We remind that the above results hold (even) when the bounding problems
BSE [U ], BME [U ], BGE [U ], and BCC are restricted to loop-free boolean pro-
grams. We also note that the results hold even when the programs are restricted
19 We do not distinguish input boolean variables from output boolean variables. But,
a boolean variable can be made output-only by assigning a constant to the variable
at the start of the program and made input-only by assigning a constant at the end.
to those without low security inputs. These results are proven by a reduction
from MAJSAT, which is a PP-complete problem. MAJSAT is the problem of
deciding, given a boolean formula φ over variables −→x , if there are more than
2|
−→x |−1 satisfying assignments to φ (i.e., whether the majority of the assignments
to φ are satisfying).
4.1 Complexities for Belief and Channel Capacity Like Definitions
This section investigates the complexity theoretic hardness of the bounding prob-
lems for the belief-based definition and the channel-capacity-like definition of
quantitative information flow introduced in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. As in
Section 4, we focus on loop-free boolean programs.
Below shows the complexity results for the belief-based comparison problems
for loop-free boolean programs [33].
(1) Checking BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M1) ≤ BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M2) is PP-hard.
(2) Checking ∀h, ℓ.BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M1) ≤ BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M2) is PP-hard.
(3) Checking ∀µ, h, ℓ.BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M1) ≤ BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M2) is coNP-complete.
First, we prove that the two types of bounding problems for the belief-based
definition, BBE1 and BBE2 , are both PP-hard.
Theorem 20. PP ⊆ BBE1 [〈U, h, ℓ〉]
Theorem 21. PP ⊆ BBE2 [U ]
As in Section 4, the above theorems are proven by a reduction from MAJSAT.
They show that the bounding problems for BE [U ] are complexity theoretically
difficult.
Next, we prove the hardness results for the channel-capacity like definitions
of quantitative information flow. Theorems 22 and 23 for BSECC and BMECC
follow from the equivalence maxµ SE [µ](M) = maxµME [µ](M) = CC (M) (cf.
Section 3.3) and Theorem 19. Theorem 24 for BGECC follows from Theorem 18
and the equivalence maxµGE [µ](M) = maxℓGE [U ⊗ ℓ˙](M) (cf. Lemma 3).
Theorem 22. PP ⊆ BSECC
Theorem 23. PP ⊆ BMECC
Theorem 24. PP ⊆ BGECC
Finally, the following coNP-completeness results for BBE1CC [h, ℓ] and
BBE2CC follow from their equivalent to non-interference and the fact that check-
ing non-interference is coNP-complete for loop-free boolean programs (cf. Sec-
tion 4).
Theorem 25. BBE1CC [h, ℓ] is coNP-complete.
Theorem 26. BBE2CC is coNP-complete.
5 Discussion
5.1 Bounding the Domains
The notion of k-safety property, like the notion of safety property from where
it extends, is defined over all programs regardless of their size. (For example,
non-interference is a 2-safety property for all programs and unreachability is a
safety property for all programs.) But, it is easy to show that the bounding
problems would become “k-safety” properties if we constrained and bounded
the input domains because then the size of the semantics (i.e., the input/output
pairs) of such programs would be bounded by |H|×|L|. In this case, the problems
are at most |H|×|L|-safety. (And the complexity theoretic hardness degenerates
to a constant.) But, like the k-safety bounds obtained by fixing q constant (cf.
Section 3.1), these bounds are high for all but very small domains and are unlikely
to lead to a practical verification method. Also, because a bound on the high
security input domain puts a bound on the maximum information flow, the
bounding problems become a tautology for q ≥ c, where c is the maximum
information flow for the respective definition.
5.2 Low Security Inputs
Recall the results from Section 3.1 that, under a constant bound, the bounding
problems for both the min-entropy based definition and the guessing-entropy
based definition with the uniform distribution are k-safety for programs without
low security inputs, but not for those with. The reason for the non-k-safety re-
sults is that the definitions of quantitative information flow ME and GE (and in
fact, also SE ) use the conditional entropy over the low security input distribution
and are parameterized by the distribution. This means that the quantitative in-
formation flow of a program is averaged over the low security inputs according to
the distribution. Therefore, by arbitrarily increasing the number of low security
inputs, given any set of traces T , it becomes possible to find a program contain-
ing T whose information flow is arbitrarily close to 0 (at least under the uniform
distribution). This appears to be a property intrinsic to any definition of quan-
titative information flow defined via conditional entropy over the low security
inputs and is parameterized by the distribution of low security inputs. Note that
the channel-capacity-like definitions do not share this property as it is defined
to be the maximum over the distributions. The non-k-safety result for BSE [U ]
holds even in the absence of low security inputs because the Shannon entropy
of a program is the average of the surprisal [8] of the individual observations,
and so by increasing the number of high security inputs, given any set of traces
T , it becomes possible to find a program containing T whose information flow
is arbitrarily close to 0. The non-k-safety results for BBE1 [〈U, h〉] and BBE2 [U ]
hold for similar reasons.20
20 They are, respectively, the surprisal of a particular input, and the maximum surprisal
over all the inputs.
6 Related Work
This work continues our recent research [32] on investigating the hardness and
possibilities of verifying quantitative information flow according to the formal
definitions proposed in literature [8, 12, 7, 19, 28, 17, 1, 22, 20, 26, 5, 18]. Much of
the previous research has focused on information theoretic properties of the def-
initions and proposed approximate (i.e., incomplete and/or unsound) methods
for checking and inferring quantitative information flow according to such def-
initions. In contrast, this paper (along with our recent paper [32]) investigates
the hardness and possibilities of precisely checking and inferring quantitative
information flow according to the definitions.
This paper has shown that the bounding problem, that is, the problem of
checking X (M) ≤ q given a program M and a positive real q, is quite hard
(for various quantitative information flow definitions X ). This is in contrast to
our previous paper that has investigated the hardness and possibilities of the
comparison problem, that is, the problem of checking X (M1) ≤ X (M2) given
programs M1 and M2. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
investigate the hardness of the bounding problems. But, the hardness of quan-
titative information flow inference, a harder problem, follows from the results of
our previous paper, and Backes et al. [1] and also Heusser and Malacaria [15] have
proposed a precise inference method that utilizes self composition and counting
algorithms. Also, independently from our work, Heusser and Malacaria [16] have
recently applied the self-composition method outlined in Section 3.1 for checking
the channel-capacity-based quantitative information flow.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have formalized and proved the hardness of the bounding prob-
lem of quantitative information flow, which is a form of (precise) checking prob-
lem of quantitative information flow. We have shown that no bounding problem
is a k-safety property for any k, and therefore that it is not possible to reduce
the problem to a safety problem via self composition, at least when the quantity
to check against is unrestricted. The result is in contrast to non-interference and
the quantitative information flow comparison problem with universally quan-
tified distribution, which are 2-safety properties. We have also shown a com-
plexity theoretic gap with these problems, which are coNP-complete, by proving
the PP-hardness of the bounding problems, when restricted to loop-free boolean
programs.
We have also shown that the bounding problems for some quantitative infor-
mation flow definitions become k-safety for different k’s under certain conditions
when the quantity to check against is restricted to be a constant, highlighting
interesting disparities among the different definitions of quantitative information
flow.
It is interesting to note that, as with the comparison problems, the bounding
problems become comparatively easier when the input distribution becomes uni-
versally quantified. That is, as our previous work [32] has shown that checking if
∀µ.Y[µ](M1) ≤ Y[µ](M2) is often easier than checking if Y[U ](M1) ≤ Y[U ](M2)
(for various quantitative information flow definitions Y), we have shown that the
problem of checking ∀µ.Y[µ](M) ≤ q is often easier than the problem of checking
Y[U ](M) ≤ q.
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A Proofs
We define some abbreviations.
Definition 14. µ(x) , µ(X = x)
We use the above notation whenever the correspondences between random vari-
ables and their values are clear.
We define some useful abbreviations for programs having low security inputs.
Definition 15. M [H, ℓ] = {o | ∃h ∈ H.o =M(h, ℓ)}
Definition 16. M(ℓ) = λh.M(h, ℓ)
Note that M(ℓ) is the programM restricted to the low security input ℓ, and
that M [H, ℓ] is the set of outputs of M(ℓ).
We elide the parameter q from the input to the bounding problems when it
is clear from the context (e.g., when q is held constant). For example, we write
BSE [U ](M) and M ∈ BSE [U ] instead of BSE [U ](M, q) or (M, q) ∈ BSE [U ].
We note the following properties of deterministic programs [6].
Lemma 4. Let M be a program without low-security inputs, M ′ be a program
with low-security inputs. Then, we have SE [µ](M) = I[µ](O;H) = H[µ](O) and
SE [µ](M ′) = I[µ](O;H |L) = H[µ](O|L)
Definition 17.
In(µ,X, x) = |{x′ ∈ X | µ(x′) ≥ µ(x)}|
Intuitively, In(µ,X, x) is the order of x defined in terms of µ.
Lemma 5.
G[µ](X) = Σ1≤i≤|X|iµ(xi) = Σx∈XIn(µ,X, x)µ(x)
Proof. Trivial.
Lemma 1. Let µ be a belief, hE be a high-security input, ℓE be a low-security
input. Then, BE [〈µ, hE , ℓE〉](M) = − logΣh∈{h′|M(h′,ℓE)=M(hE ,ℓE)}µ(h).
Proof. By definition, we have
BE [〈µ, hE , ℓE〉](M)
= D(µ→ h˙E)−D(µ|oE → h˙E)
=
∑
h h˙E(h) log
h˙E (h)
µ(h) −
∑
h h˙E(h) log
h˙E(h)
µ|oE(h)
= log 1
µ(hE)
+ log µ(hE)∑
h∈{h′|M(h′ ,ℓE )=M(hE ,ℓE )}
µ(h)
= − log
∑
h∈{h′|M(h′,ℓE)=M(hE ,ℓE)}
µ(h)
Theorem 1. Let µ be a distribution such that ∀h ∈ H, ℓ ∈ L.µ(h, ℓ) > 0. Then,
– M is non-interferent if and only if SE [µ](M) ≤ 0.
– M is non-interferent if and only if ME [µ](M) ≤ 0.
– M is non-interferent if and only if GE [µ](M) ≤ 0.
– M is non-interferent if and only if BE [〈µ′, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ 0.21
– M is non-interferent if and only if CC (M) ≤ 0.
Proof. Let O = {M(h, ℓ) | h ∈ H ∧ ℓ ∈ L}.
– SE
(See [6].)
– ME
• ⇒
Suppose M is non-interferent. By the definition, it suffices to show that
V [µ](H |L) = V [µ](H |L,O)
That is, ∑
ℓ
µ(ℓ)max
h
µ(h|ℓ) =
∑
ℓ,o
µ(ℓ, o)max
h
µ(h|ℓ, o)
We have for any ℓx and ox such that µ(ℓx, ox) > 0, µ(ℓx, ox) = µ(ℓx),
and for all hy, ℓy, and oy such that µ(hy, ℓy, oy) > 0, for any h
′
y and
o′ ∈ O \ {oy}, µ(h
′
y, ℓy, o
′
y) = 0. Therefore, we have
∑
ℓ,o µ(ℓ, o)maxh µ(h|ℓ, o) =
∑
ℓ,o µ(ℓ, o)maxh
µ(h,ℓ,o)
µ(ℓ,o)
=
∑
ℓ µ(ℓ)maxh µ(h|ℓ)
21 Recall Definition 10 that µ′ is a distribution over H such that µ′(h) > 0 for all h ∈ H.
• ⇐
We prove the contraposition. Suppose M is interferent. That is, there
exist h1, h2, and ℓ
′ such that M(h1, ℓ
′) 6= M(h2, ℓ
′). Let o1 = M(h1, ℓ
′)
and o2 =M(h2, ℓ
′). We have
∑
ℓ
µ(ℓ)max
h
µ(h|ℓ) = A+max
h
µ(h, ℓ′)
where A =
∑
ℓ∈L\{ℓ′}maxh µ(h, ℓ). And,
∑
ℓ,o
µ(ℓ, o)max
h
µ(h|ℓ, o) = B +
∑
o
max
h
µ(h, ℓ′, o)
where B =
∑
(ℓ,o)∈(L\{ℓ′})×Omaxh µ(h, ℓ, o). Trivially, we have A ≤ B
and
max
h
µ(h, ℓ′) <
∑
o
max
h
µ(h, ℓ′, o)
Therefore, we have ME [µ](M) > 0.
– GE
• ⇒
Suppose M is non-interferent. By the definition,
GE [µ](M)
=
∑
ℓ
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, ℓ)
−
∑
ℓ,o
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ, o),H, h)µ(h, ℓ, o)
=
∑
ℓ
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, ℓ)
−
∑
ℓ
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, ℓ)
= 0
since for all hx, ℓx, and ox such that µ(hx, ℓx, ox) > 0, for any h
′
x and
o′ ∈ O \ {ox}, µ(h
′
x, ℓx, o
′
x) = 0.
• ⇐
We prove the contraposition. Suppose M is interferent. That is, there
exist h1, h2, and ℓ
′ such that M(h1, ℓ
′) 6= M(h2, ℓ
′). Let o1 = M(h1, ℓ
′)
and o2 =M(h2, ℓ
′). By the definition,
GE [µ](M)
=
∑
ℓ
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, ℓ)
−
∑
ℓ,o
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ, o),H, h)µ(h, ℓ, o)
= A+
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ′),H, h)µ(h, ℓ′)
−B −
∑
o
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ′, o),H, h)µ(h, ℓ′, o)
where
A =
∑
ℓ∈L\{ℓ′}
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ′),H, h)µ(h, ℓ′)
B =
∑
(ℓ,o)∈(L\{ℓ′})×O
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ′, o),H, h)µ(h, ℓ′, o)
Trivially, we have A ≥ B and
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ′),H, h)µ(h, ℓ′)
>
∑
o
∑
h In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ′, o),H, h)µ(h, ℓ′, o)
Therefore, we have GE [µ](M) > 0.
– BE
• ⇒
Suppose M is non-interferent. By Lemma 1, for any µ, h, and ℓ,
BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) = − logΣh′∈{h′′|M(h′′,ℓ)=M(h,ℓ)}µ(h
′) = 0
• ⇐
We prove the contraposition. Suppose M is interferent. That is, there
exist h1, h2, and ℓ
′ such that M(h1, ℓ
′) 6= M(h2, ℓ
′). Let µ′ be a distri-
bution such that for any h′, µ′(h′) > 0. Then, by Lemma 1, we have for
any h,
BE [〈µ′, h, ℓ′〉](M) = − logΣh′∈{h′′|M(h′′,ℓ′)=M(h,ℓ′)}µ
′(h′) > 0
– CC
• ⇒
Suppose M is non-interferent. By Lemma 4, for any µ,
SE [µ](M) = H[µ](O|L)
=
∑
o
∑
ℓ µ(o, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o,ℓ)
= 0
since µ(o, ℓ) = µ(ℓ). Therefore, we have ∀µ.SE [µ](M) = 0. It follows
that CC (M) = 0.
• ⇐
We prove the contraposition. Suppose M is interferent. That is, there
exist h1, h2, and ℓ
′ such that M(h1, ℓ
′) 6=M(h2, ℓ
′). Let o1 =M(h1, ℓ
′),
and o2 =M(h2, ℓ
′). Then, there exist µ′ such that
SE [µ′](M) = H[µ′](O|L)
≥ µ′(o1, ℓ
′) log µ
′(ℓ′)
µ′(o1,ℓ′)
+ µ′(o2, ℓ
′) log µ
′(ℓ′)
µ′(o2,ℓ′)
> 0
And, we have SE [µ′](M) ≤ CC (M).
We note the following equivalence of CC and ME[U] for programs without
low security inputs [28].
Lemma 6. Let M be a program without low security input. Then, CC (M) =
ME [U ](M).
Theorem 2. Neither BSE [U ], BME [U ], BGE [U ], nor BCC is a k-safety property
for any k such that k > 0.
Proof.
– BSE [U ] is not a k-safety problem for any k such that k > 0.
Trivial by Theorem 8.
– BME [U ] is not a k-safety property for any k such that k > 0.
Trivial by Theorem 4.
– BGE [U ] is not a k-safety property for any k such that k > 0.
Trivial by Theorem 5.
– BCC is not a k-safety property for any k such that k > 0.
Trivial from Lemma 6 and the fact that BME [U ] is not a k-safety property
for any k.
Malacaria and Chen [20] have proved the following result relating the channel-
capacity based quantitative information flow with the number of outputs.
Lemma 7. Let M be a program (with low security input). Then,
CC (M) = maxℓ∈L log |M [H, ℓ]|
Theorem 3. Let q be a constant. Then, BCC is ⌊2
q⌋ + 1-safety, but it is not
k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2q⌋.
Proof. We prove that BCC is ⌊2
q⌋ + 1-safety. Let M be a program such that
M 6∈ BCC . By Lemma 7, it must be the case that there exists ℓ such that
|M [H, ℓ]| ≥ ⌊2q⌋ + 1. Then, there exists T ⊆ [[M ]] such that |T | ≤ ⌊2q⌋ + 1,
ran(T ) ≥ ⌊2q⌋ + 1, and for all ((h, ℓ′), o) ∈ T , ℓ′ = ℓ. Then, by Lemma 7, it
follows that for any program M ′ such that T ⊆ [[M ′]], M ′ 6∈ BCC . Therefore,
BCC is a ⌊2
q⌋+ 1-safety property.
Finally, we prove that BCC [U ] is not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2
q⌋. Let k ≤ ⌊2q⌋.
For a contradiction, suppose BCC is a k-safety property. Let M be a program
such that M 6∈ BCC . Then, there exists T such that |T | ≤ k and T ⊆ [[M ]], and
for any M ′ such that T ⊆ [[M ′]], (M ′, q) 6∈ BCC . Let T = {(h1, o1), . . . , (hi, oi)}.
Let M¯ be a program such that [[M¯ ]] = T . More formally, let M¯ be the following
program.
M¯(h1) = o1, M¯(h2) = o2, . . . , M¯(hi) = oi
Then, we have
CC (M¯) = log |{o1, o2, . . . , oi}| ≤ log k ≤ q
It follows that (M¯, q) ∈ CC , but T ⊆ [[M¯ ]]. Therefore, this leads to a contradic-
tion.
Theorem 4. Let q be a constant, and suppose BME [U ] only takes programs
without low security inputs. Then, BME [U ] is ⌊2
q⌋ + 1-safety, but it is not k-
safety for any k ≤ ⌊2q⌋.
Proof. Straightforward by Theorem 3 and Lemma 6.
Lemma 8. Let M be a program without low security inputs. Then, we have
GE [U ](M) = n2 −
1
2n
∑
o |Ho|
2 where n is the number of inputs, and Ho =
{h | o =M(h)}.
Proof. By the definition, we have
GE [U ](M) = G[U ](H)− G[U ](H |O)
=
∑
h In(U,H, h)U(h)
−
∑
o U(o)
∑
h In(λh
′.U(h′|o),Ho, h)U(h|o)
= 1
n
1
2n(n+ 1)−
∑
o
|Ho|
n
1
2
1
|Ho|
|Ho|(|Ho|+ 1)
= n2 −
1
2n
∑
o |Ho|
2
Lemma 9. Let M and M ′ be low-security input free programs such that [[M ′]] =
[[M ]] ∪ {(h, o)} and h 6∈ dom([[M ]]). Then, we have GE [U ](M) ≤ GE [U ](M ′).
Proof. We prove GE [U ](M ′) − GE [U ](M) ≥ 0. Let n = |[[M ]]|, O = ran([[M ]]),
H = dom(M), and Ho = {h ∈ H | o =M(h)}.
By Lemma 8, we have
GE [U ](M ′)−GE [U ](M)
= n+12 −
1
2(n+1) (B + (|Ho|+ 1)
2)− n2 +
1
2n (B + |Ho|
2)
= 12n(n+1) ((n− |Ho|)
2 +B) ≥ 0
where B =
∑
o′∈O\{o} |Ho′ |
2 and Ho′ = {h | o
′ =M(h)}.
Lemma 10. Let q ≥ 12 . Let M be a program without low security inputs such
that GE [U ](M) > q and ∀M ′.[[M ′]] ( [[M ]] ⇒ GE [U ](M ′) ≤ q. Then, it must
be the case that |[[M ]]| ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1.
Proof. Let n be the integer such that n = |[[M ]]|. If M returns only one out-
put, we have GE [U ](M) = 0. Therefore, M must have more than 1 output as
GE [U ](M) > q. By Lemma 8, we have for any o′
GE [U ](M) = n2 −
1
2n (B + (n− i)
2)
= i− 12n (B + i
2)
where i =
∑
o∈O\{o′} |Ho| and B =
∑
o∈O\{o′} |Ho|
2. Because GE [U ](M) > q,
we have i > q. Then, we have
GE [U ](M) > q iff i− B+i
2
2n > q
iff n > B+i
2
2(i−q)
By the definition of M , we have ∀M ′.[[M ′]] ( [[M ]] ⇒ GE [U ](M ′) ≤ q. Let
[[M¯ ]] = [[M ]] \ {(h′, o′)} where M(h′) = o′. Then, we have
GE [U ](M¯) ≤ q iff i− B+i
2
2(n−1) ≤ q
iff n ≤ B+i
2
2(i−q) + 1
Hence, we have
B + i2
2(i− q)
< n ≤
B + i2
2(i− q)
+ 1
Because B =
∑
o∈O\{o′} |Ho|
2 and i =
∑
o∈O\{o′} |Ho|, the largest n occurs when
B = i2. That is, whenM has exactly two outputs. Therefore, it suffices to prove
the lemma for just such M ’s.
Now, we prove |[[M ]]| ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋ + 1. Recall that i =
∑
o∈O\{o′} |Ho|. Let
j = n− i. We have
GE [U ](M) = i− 12n (i
2 + i2)
= j − j
2
n
> q
This means that j > q. Recall that [[M¯ ]] = [[M ]] \ {(h′, o′)} where M(h′) = o′.
Then, we have
GE [U ](M¯) ≤ q iff i− i
2
n−1 ≤ q
iff n ≤ i
2
i−q + 1
Because n is an integer, we have n ≤ ⌊ i
2
i−q ⌋ + 1 and n ≤ ⌊
j2
j−q ⌋ + 1. Let f =
i2
i−q +1 =
j2
j−q +1. By elementary real analysis, it can be shown that for integers
i and j such that i > q and j > q, f attains its maximum value when i = ⌊q⌋+1
or j = ⌊q⌋+ 1. Therefore, it follows that |[[M ]]| = n ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1.
Lemma 11. Let q ≥ 12 . Let M be a program without low-security inputs such
that GE [U ](M) > q. Then, there exists T such that
– T ⊆ [[M ]]
– |T | ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1
– GE [U ](M ′) > q where [[M ′]] = T .
Proof. Let q ≥ 12 . Let M be a program such that GE [U ](M) > q. By Lemma 9
and the fact that GE [U ](M) is bounded by |[[M ]]|2 , there exists T such that
– T ⊆ [[M ]]
– GE [U ](M ′) > q where [[M ′]] = T
– ∀T ′ ⊆ T.GE [U ](M¯) ≤ q where [[M¯ ]] = T ′.
By Lemma 10, we have |T | ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1. Therefore, we have the conclusion.
Theorem 5. Let q be a constant, and suppose BGE [U ] only takes programs
without low security inputs. If q ≥ 12 , then, BGE [U ] is ⌊
(⌊q⌋+1)2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋ + 1-safety,
but it is not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋. Otherwise, q <
1
2 and BGE [U ] is
2-safety, but it is not 1-safety.
Proof. First, we prove that BGE [U ] for programs without low-security inputs is
⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+1-safety for q ≥
1
2 . By the definition of k-safety, for anyM such that
M 6∈ BGE [U ], there exists T such that
1. T ⊆ [[M ]]
2. |T | ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1
3. ∀M ′.T ⊆ [[M ′]]⇒M ′ 6∈ BGE [U ]
We show that if M 6∈ BGE [U ], then there exists T such that
– T ⊆ [[M ]]
– |T | ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1
– GE [U ](M ′) > q where [[M ′]] = T .
Note that GE [U ](M ′) > q and Lemma 9 imply the condition 3 above. Suppose
that M 6∈ BGE [U ]. Then, by Lemma 11, there exists T ⊆ [[M ]] such that |T | ≤
⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1, and GE [U ](M
′) > q where [[M ′]] = T .
Next, we prove BGE [U ] for programs without low-security inputs is not k-
safety for any k ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋. For a contradiction, suppose BGE [U ] is a k-safety
property. Let M be a program such that
M(h1) = o,M(h2) = o, . . . ,M(hi) = o,
M(hi+1) = o
′,M(hi+2) = o
′, . . . ,M(hn) = o
′
where h1, h2, . . . hn, and o, o
′ are distinct, n = ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+1, and i = ⌊q⌋+1. Let
Ho = {h | o =M(h)} and and Ho′ = {h | o
′ =M(h)}. By Lemma 8, we have
GE [U ](M) = n2 −
1
2n (|Ho|
2 + |Ho′ |
2)
= i− i
2
n
= ⌊q⌋+ 1− (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q
⌋+1
Let p = ⌊q⌋+ 1. If (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q is an integer, then we have
GE [U ](M) = p− p
2
⌊ p
2
p−q ⌋+1
= p− p
2
p2+p−q
p−q
= q( (p−q)
2
p2q+pq−q2 + 1)
> q
The last line follows from p2q + pq − q2 = p2q + q(p− q) > 0.
Otherwise, we have ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1 = ⌈
(⌊q⌋+1)2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌉ >
(⌊q⌋+1)2
⌊q⌋+1−q . And,
GE [U ](M) = p− p
2
⌈ p
2
p−q ⌉
> p− p
2
p2
p−q
= q
Hence, we have GE [U ](M) > q. Therefore, M 6∈ BGE [U ]. Then, there exists T
such that |T | ≤ k, T ⊆ [[M ]], and for anyM ′ such that T ⊆ [[M ′]],M ′ 6∈ BGE [U ].
Let M¯ be a program such that [[M¯ ]] = T . Then, by Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, we
have
GE [U ](M¯) ≤ n−12 −
1
2(n−1) (i
2 + (n− 1− i)2)
= i− i
2
⌊ i
2
i−q ⌋
≤ i− i
2
i2
i−q
= q
It follows that M¯ ∈ BGE [U ]. Recall that T ⊆ [[M¯ ]]. Therefore, this leads to a
contradiction.
Next, we prove that BGE [U ] is 2-safety for any q <
1
2 . It suffices to show that
GE [U ](M) ≤ q iff M is non-interferent, because non-interference is a 2-safety
property and not a 1-safety property [23, 3, 11]. We prove that if GE [U ](M) ≤ q
thenM is non-interferent. The other direction follows from Theorem 1. We prove
the contraposition. SupposeM is interferent. It must be the case that there exist
h and h′ such that M(h) 6=M(h′). Let o =M(h), and o′ =M(h′). Let M ′ be a
program such that [[M ′]] = {(h, o), (h′, o′)}. Note that we have [[M ′]] ⊆ [[M ]]. By
Lemma 9, we have
GE [U ](M ′) =
1
2
≤ GE [U ](M)
It follows that GE [U ](M) > q.
Lemma 12. Let M be a program that has a low-security input, a high-security
input, and a low-security output. Then, we have
ME [U ](M) = log
|OL|
|L|
where OL = {(o, ℓ) | ∃h.o =M(h, ℓ)}, and L is sample space of the low-security
input.
Proof. By the definition of ME , we have
ME [U ](M) = log
1
V [U ](H |L)
− log
1
V [U ](H |O,L)
where
V [U ](H |L) = 1|H|
V [U ](H |O,L) = |OL||H||L|
It follows that
ME [U ](M) = log
|OL|
|L|
Theorem 6. Let q be a constant. (And let BME [U ] take programs with low
security inputs.) Then, BME [U ] is not a k-safety property for any k > 0.
Proof. For a contradiction, suppose BME [U ] is a k-safety property. Let M be
a program such that M 6∈ BME [U ]. Then, there exists T such that |T | ≤ k,
T ⊆ [[M ]], and for any M ′ such that T ⊆ [[M ′]], M ′ 6∈ BME [U ]. Let T =
{((h1, ℓ1), o1), . . . , ((hi, ℓi), oi)}. Let M¯ be the following program.
M¯(h1, ℓ1) = o1, M¯(h2, ℓ2) = o2, . . . , M¯(hi, ℓi) = oi,
M¯(hi+1, ℓi+1) = oi, M¯(hi+2, ℓi+2) = oi, . . . , M¯(hn, ℓn) = oi
where n = |H¯||L¯|, and H¯, L¯ are the high security inputs and the low security
inputs of M¯ . Then, by Lemma 12, we have
ME [U ](M¯) = log |OL¯|
|L¯|
≤ log i+|L¯|
|L¯|
Therefore, for any q > 0, there exists L¯ such that ME [U ](M¯) ≤ q and T ⊆ [[M¯ ]].
Therefore, this leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 13. Let M be a program that has a high-security input with sample
space H, a low-security input with sample space L, and a low-security output.
Then, we have
GE [U ](M) =
|H|
2
−
1
2|H||L|
∑
o,ℓ
|Ho,ℓ|
2
where Ho,ℓ = {h | o =M(h, ℓ)}.
Proof. By the definition, we have
GE [U ](M) = G[U ](H |L)− G[U ](H |O,L)
=
∑
ℓ U(ℓ)
∑
h In(λh
′.U(h′|ℓ),H, h)U(h|ℓ)
−
∑
o,ℓ U(o, ℓ)
∑
h In(λh
′.U(h′|o, ℓ),Ho,ℓ, h)U(h|o, ℓ)
= |H|+12 −
∑
o,ℓ
|Ho,ℓ|
|H||L|
1
|Ho,ℓ|
1
2 |Ho,ℓ|(|Ho,ℓ|+ 1)
= |H|2 −
1
2|H||L|
∑
o,ℓ |Ho,ℓ|
2
Theorem 7. Let q be a constant. (And let BGE [U ] take programs with low se-
curity inputs.) Then, BGE [U ] is not a k-safety property for any k > 0.
Proof. For a contradiction, suppose BGE [U ] is a k-safety property. Let M be
a program such that M 6∈ BGE [U ]. Then, there exists T such that |T | ≤ k,
T ⊆ [[M ]], and for any M ′ such that T ⊆ [[M ′]], M ′ 6∈ BGE [U ]. Let T =
{((h1, ℓ1), o1), . . . , ((hi, ℓi), oi)}. Let M¯ be the following program.
M¯(h1, ℓ1) = o1, M¯(h2, ℓ2) = o2, . . . , M¯(hi, ℓi) = oi,
M¯(hi+1, ℓi+1) = oi, M¯(hi+2, ℓi+2) = oi, . . . M¯(hmn, ℓmn) = oi
where n = |H¯| and m = |L¯|, and H¯, L¯ are the high security inputs and the low
security inputs of M¯ . Then, by Lemma 13, we have
GE [U ](M¯) = n2 −
1
2mn
∑
o,ℓ |Ho,ℓ|
2
≤ n2 −
1
2mn (in+ (m− i)n
2)
= 12mn (−in+ in
2)
Therefore, for any q > 0, there exists L¯ such that GE [U ](M¯) ≤ q and T ⊆ [[M¯ ]].
Therefore, this leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 8. Let q be a constant and suppose BSE [U ] only takes programs with-
out low security inputs. Then, BSE [U ] is not a k-safety property for any k > 0.
Proof. For a contradiction, suppose BSE [U ] is a k-safety property. Let M be
a program such that M 6∈ BSE [U ]. Then, there exists T such that |T | ≤ k,
T ⊆ [[M ]], and for any M ′ such that T ⊆ [[M ′]], M ′ 6∈ BSE [U ]. Let T =
{(h1, o1), . . . , (hi, oi)}. Let M¯ and M¯ ′ be the following programs.
M¯(h1) = o1, M¯(h2) = o2, . . . , M¯(hi) = oi, M¯(hi+1) = o, . . . , M¯(hn) = o
M¯ ′(h1) = o
′
1, M¯
′(h2) = o
′
2, . . . , M¯
′(hi) = o
′
i, M¯
′(hi+1) = o
′, . . . , M¯ ′(hn) = o
′
where h1, h2, . . . , hn are distinct, and o
′
1, o
′
2, . . . , o
′
i, and o
′ are distinct. Then,
we have
SE [U ](M¯) ≤ SE [U ](M¯ ′)
= i
n
logn+ n−i
n
log n
n−i
= log n
n−i +
i
n
log(n− i)
Therefore, for any q > 0, there exists M¯ such that SE [U ](M¯) ≤ q and T ⊆ [[M¯ ]].
Therefore, this leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 9. Let q be a constant, and suppose BBE1 [〈U, h〉] only takes programs
without low security inputs. Then, BBE1 [〈U, h〉] is not a k-safety property for any
k > 0.
Proof. For a contradiction, suppose BBE1 [〈U, h〉] is a k-safety property. Let M
be a program such that
M(h1) = o, . . . ,M(hm) = o,M(h) = o
′
wherem = ⌊2q⌋, and h, h1, . . . , hm and o, o
′ are distinct. Then, we haveBE [〈U, h〉](M) =
log(m + 1) > log 2q = q. That is, (M, q) 6∈ BBE1 [〈U, h〉]. Then, it must be the
case that there is T such that |T | ≤ k, T ⊆ [[M ]], and for any M¯ such that
T ⊆ [[M¯ ]], (M¯, q) 6∈ BBE1 [〈U, h〉]. Let T = {(h
′
1, o
′
1), . . . , (h
′
i, o
′
i)}. Let M¯ be the
following program.
M¯(h′1) = o
′
1, M¯(h
′
2) = o
′
2, . . . , M¯(h
′
i) = o
′
i,
M¯(h′i+1) = o
′, M¯(h′i+2) = o
′, . . . , M¯(h′n) = o
′
where
– h′1, h
′
2, . . . , h
′
n are distinct,
– h ∈ {h′1, . . . , h
′
n},
– {o′1, o
′
2, . . . , o
′
i} = {o, o
′}, and
– M¯(h) = o′.
Then, we have
BE [〈U, h〉](M¯) ≤ − log n−i
n
It follows that there exists n such that BE [〈U, h〉](M¯) ≤ q. This leads to a
contradiction.
Lemma 14. Let T be a trace such that T = {((h1, ℓ
′), o1), . . . , ((hi, ℓ
′), oi)}
where o1, . . . , oi are distinct. Let M be the program such that [[M ]] = T and M
′
be a program such that [[M ′]] ⊇ T . Then, we have maxh,ℓBE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M
′) ≥
maxh,ℓBE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M).
Proof. By definition, we have
maxh,ℓ BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M) = log i
maxh,ℓBE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M
′) = maxh,ℓ− logΣh0∈{h′|M ′(h′,ℓ)=M ′(h,ℓ)}U(h0)
≥ maxh− logΣh0∈{h′|M ′(h′,ℓ′)=M ′(h,ℓ′)}U(h0)
= log |{h
′|∃o.M ′(h′,ℓ′)=o}|
mino |{h′|M ′(h′,ℓ′)=o}|
Therefore, it suffices to show that
|{h′ | ∃o.M ′(h′, ℓ′) = o}| ≥ imin
o
{h′ |M ′(h′, ℓ′) = o}
Then,
|{h′ | ∃o.M ′(h′, ℓ′) = o}| − imino{h
′ |M ′(h′, ℓ′) = o}
≥ (m− i)mino{h
′ |M ′(h′, ℓ′) = o}
≥ 0
where m = |{o | ∃h.M ′(h, ℓ′) = o}|.
Theorem 10. Let q be a constant. If q ≥ 1, then BBE2 [U ] is not a k-safety
property for any k > 0 even when BBE2 [U ] only takes programs without low
security inputs. Otherwise, q < 1 and BBE2 [U ] is a 2-safety property, but it is
not a 1-safety property.
Proof. First, we show for the case q ≥ 1, BBE2 [U ] is not a k-safety property for
any k > 0. For a contradiction, suppose BBE2 [U ] is a k-safety property. Let M
be the program such that
M = {h1 7→ o, . . . , hm 7→ o, h 7→ o
′}
where m = ⌊2q⌋. Then, we have BE [〈U, h〉](M) = log(m+1) > log 2q = q. That
is, (M, q) 6∈ BBE2 [U ]. Then, it must be the case that there exists T such that
|T | ≤ k, T ⊆ [[M ]], and for anyM ′ such that T ⊆ [[M ′]], (M ′, q) 6∈ BBE2 [U ]. Note
that for any M ′ such that [[M ′]] ( [[M ]], ∀h.BE [〈U, h〉](M ′) ≤ q, and therefore,
it must be the case that such T must be equal to [[M ]].
Let M¯ be the following program.
M¯(h1) = o, M¯(h2) = o, . . . , M¯(hm) = o,
M¯(h) = o′, M¯(hm+1) = o
′, M¯(hm+2) = o
′, . . . , M¯(h2m−1) = o
′
where h, h1, . . . , h2m−1 are distinct.
Then, we have |{h′ | M¯(h′) = o}| = |{h′ | M¯(h′) = o′}| = m. Therefore, for
any h′,
BE [〈U, h′〉](M¯) = − log
m
2m
= 1 ≤ q
This leads to a contradiction.
Next, we prove that BBE2 [U ] is a 2-safety property for any q < 1. It suffices
to show that ∀h, ℓ.BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ q iff M is non-interferent, because non-
interference is a 2-safety property and is not a 1-safety property [23, 3, 11]. We
prove that if ∀h, ℓ.BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ q then M is non-interferent. The other
direction follows from Theorem 1. We prove the contraposition. Suppose M
is interferent. It must be the case that there exist h0, h1, and ℓ
′ such that
M(h0, ℓ
′) 6= M(h1, ℓ
′). Let o = M(h0, ℓ
′), and o′ = M(h1, ℓ
′). Let M ′ be a
program such that [[M ′]] = {((h0, ℓ
′), o), ((h1, ℓ
′), o′)}. Note that we have [[M ′]] ⊆
[[M ]]. By Lemma 14, we have
max
h,ℓ
BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M ′) = 1 ≤ max
h,ℓ
BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉](M)
It follows that ¬(∀h, ℓ.BE [〈U, h, ℓ〉] ≤ q).
Theorem 11. Let q be a constant. Then, BSECC is ⌊2
q⌋+1-safety, but it is not
k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2q⌋.
Proof. Trivial from Theorem 3 and the fact that BSECC is equivalent to BCC .
Lemma 15. Let µ be a distribution. Then, for any low-security input ℓ, we have
mℓmaxh µ(h, ℓ) ≥
∑
omaxh µ(h, ℓ, o) where mℓ = |M [H, ℓ]|
Proof.
mℓmaxh µ(h, ℓ)−
∑
omaxh µ(h, ℓ, o)
=
∑
o(maxh µ(h, ℓ)−maxh µ(h, ℓ, o))
≥ 0
since we have ∀o.maxh µ(h, ℓ) ≥ maxh µ(h, ℓ, o).
Lemma 2. maxµME [µ](M) = CC (M)
Proof. The statement was proved for programs without low security inputs by
Braun et al. [5]. We show that the same result holds for programs with low
security inputs.
Let ℓ′ be a low-security input such that for any ℓ, mℓ′ ≥ mℓ where mℓ0 =
|M [H, ℓ0]|. Let µ
′ be a distribution such that ∀h.µ′(h, ℓ′) = 1
n
where n is the num-
ber of high-security inputs. We have CC (M) = ME [µ′](M) = logmℓ′ . Therefore,
it suffices to show that for any µ, ME [µ′](M) ≥ ME [µ](M). By definition,
ME [µ′](M) = log
∑
o
maxh µ
′(h,ℓ′,o)
maxh µ′(h,ℓ′)
ME [µ](M) = log
∑
ℓ
∑
o
maxh µ(h,ℓ,o)∑
ℓ
maxh µ(h,ℓ)
Therefore, it suffices to show that
(
∑
omaxh µ
′(h, ℓ′, o))(
∑
ℓmaxh µ(h, ℓ))
−(maxh µ
′(h, ℓ′))(
∑
ℓ
∑
omaxh µ(h, ℓ, o)) ≥ 0
By Lemma 15,
(
∑
omaxh µ
′(h, ℓ′, o))(
∑
ℓmaxh µ(h, ℓ))
−(maxh µ
′(h, ℓ′))(
∑
ℓ
∑
omaxh µ(h, ℓ, o))
= mℓ′
n
∑
ℓmaxh µ(h, ℓ)−
1
n
(
∑
ℓ
∑
omaxh µ(h, ℓ, o))
≥ mℓ′
n
(
∑
ℓmaxh µ(h, ℓ)−
∑
ℓ
mℓ
mℓ′
maxh µ(h, ℓ))
≥ 0
Therefore, we have ME [µ′](M) ≥ ME [µ](M).
Theorem 12. Let q be a constant. Then, BMECC is ⌊2
q⌋ + 1-safety, but it is
not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊2q⌋.
Proof. Trivial by Theorem 3 and Lemma 2.
We define the “normal form” of the guessing-entropy-based quantitative in-
formation flow expression.
Definition 18 (Guessing entropy QIF Normal Form). LetM be a program
without low-security input. The guessing-entropy based quantitative information
flow GE [µ](M) can be written as the linear expression (over µ(h1), . . . , µ(hn))∑
i aiµ(hi) where µ(h1) ≥ µ(h2) ≥ · · · ≥ µ(hn), and each ai is a non-negative
integer. We call this expression
∑
i aiµ(hi) the normal form of GE [µ](M).
Lemma 16. Let M be a program without low-security input. Let
∑
i aiµ(hi) be
the normal form of GE [µ](M). Then, for any x such that x < |H|, we have
∑
i≤x
ai ≤
1
2
(x− 1)x−
1
2
(j − 2)(j − 1)
where j = |{h ∈ {h1, . . . , hx+1} |M(h) =M(hx+1)}|.
Proof. By the definition of guessing-entropy-based quantitative information flow,
we have
ai = i− |{h ∈ {h1, . . . , hi} |M(h) =M(hi)}|
Therefore, we have
∑
i≤x ai
=
∑
i≤x(i− |{h ∈ {h1, . . . , hi} |M(h) =M(hi)}|)
= 12x(x+ 1)−
1
2 (j − 1)j
−
∑
i∈{i′≤x|M(hi′ ) 6=M(hx+1)}
|{h ∈ {h1, . . . , hi} |M(h) =M(hi)}|
≤ 12 (x− 1)x−
1
2 (j − 2)(j − 1)
where j = |{h ∈ {h1, . . . , hx+1} |M(h) =M(hx+1)}|
Lemma 17. Let M be a program without low-security input. Let
∑
i aiµ(hi) be
the normal form of GE [µ](M). Then, for any x such that x < |H|, we have∑
i≤x ai ≤ xax+1.
Proof. By Lemma 16, we have
∑
i≤x
ai ≤
1
2
(x− 1)x−
1
2
(j − 2)(j − 1)
where j = |{h ∈ {h1, . . . , hx+1} |M(h) =M(hx+1)}|, that is, j = x+ 1− ax+1.
Therefore, it suffices to show that 12 (x− 1)x−
1
2 (j − 2)(j − 1) ≤ xax+1. Then,
xax+1 −
1
2
(x− 1)x+
1
2
(j − 2)(j − 1) =
1
2
((x +
3− 2j
2
)2 −
1
4
)
By elementary numerical analysis, it can be shown that for integers x and j such
that x+1 ≥ j, 12 ((x+
(3−2j)
2 )
2− 14 ) attains its minimum value 0 when x = j−1.
Therefore, we have
∑
i≤x ai ≤ xax+1.
Lemma 18. Let M be a program without low-security input. Let µ be a distribu-
tion. Let h1, . . . , hn be such that µ(h1) = µ(h2) = · · · = µ(hi−1) > µ(hi) ≥ · · · ≥
µ(hn). Let µ
′ be a distribution such that (i−1)µ(h1)+µ(hi)
i
= µ′(h1) = · · · = µ
′(hi),
and ∀x.x > i⇒ µ′(hx) = µ(hx). Then, we have GE [µ](M) ≤ GE [µ
′](M).
Proof. Let
∑
j ajµ(hj) be the normal form of GE [µ](M). By the construction
of µ′,
∑
j ajµ
′(hj) is the normal form of GE [µ
′](M). Therefore,
GE [µ′](M)−GE [µ](M)
=
∑
j ajµ
′(hj)−
∑
j ajµ(hj)
= (a1 + · · ·+ ai)
(i−1)µ(h1)+µ(hi)
i
− (a1 + · · ·+ ai−1)µ(h1)− aiµ(hi)
= 1
i
((i − 1)ai −A)(µ(h1)− µ(hi))
where A = a1 + · · · + ai−1. Since we have (i − 1)ai − (a1 + · · · + ai−1) ≥ 0 by
Lemma 17, and µ(h1)− µ(hi) > 0, we have
1
i
((i− 1)ai −A)(µ(h1)− µ(hi)) ≥ 0
Therefore, we have GE [µ′](M) ≥ GE [µ](M).
Lemma 3. We have maxµGE [µ](M) = maxℓ′ GE [U ⊗ ℓ˙′](M) where U ⊗ ℓ˙′
denotes λh, ℓ.if ℓ = ℓ′ then U(h) else 0.
Proof.
GE [µ](M) =
∑
ℓ µ(ℓ)
∑
i iµ(hi|ℓ)−
∑
ℓ
∑
o µ(ℓ, o)
∑
i iµ(hi|ℓ, o)
=
∑
ℓ µ(ℓ)(
∑
i iµ(hi|ℓ)−
∑
o
∑
i iµ(hi, o|ℓ))
=
∑
ℓ µ(ℓ)GE [λh.µ(h|ℓ)](M(ℓ))
By Lemma 18, we have maxµGE [µ](M(ℓ)) = GE [U ](M(ℓ)). Therefore, we have
maxµGE [µ](M) = (maxℓ′ GE [U ⊗ ℓ˙′](M)).
Lemma 19. Let M and M ′ be programs such that [[M ′]] = [[M ]] ∪ {((h′, ℓ′), o)}
and (h′, ℓ′) 6∈ dom([[M ]]). Then, we have maxℓGE [U ⊗ ℓ](M) ≤ maxℓGE [U ⊗
ℓ](M ′).
Proof. By Lemma 9, for any ℓ, we have GE [U ⊗ ℓ](M) ≤ GE [U ⊗ ℓ](M ′). There-
fore, maxℓGE [U ⊗ ℓ](M) ≤ maxℓGE [U ⊗ ℓ](M
′).
Theorem 13. Let q be a constant. If q ≥ 12 , then, BGECC is ⌊
(⌊q⌋+1)2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋ + 1-
safety, but it is not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋. Otherwise, q <
1
2 and
BGECC is 2-safety, but it is not 1-safety.
Proof. By Lemma 3, (M, q) ∈ BGECC iff maxℓ′ GE [U ⊗ ℓ˙′](M) ≤ q.
22 We prove
for the case q ≥ 12 by a “reduction” to the result of Theorem 5. The case for
q < 12 follows by essentially the same argument.
First, we show that BGECC is ⌊
(⌊q⌋+1)2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1-safety in this case. By the defi-
nition of k-safety, for any M such that M 6∈ BGECC , there exists T such that
1. T ⊆ [[M ]]
2. |T | ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1
3. ∀M ′.T ⊆ [[M ′]]⇒M ′ 6∈ BGECC
Suppose thatM 6∈ BGECC . By Lemma 3, it must be the case that there exists ℓ
′
such that maxµGE [µ](M) = GE [U ](M(ℓ
′)). Then, by Lemma 11, there exists
T ⊆ [[M(ℓ′)]] such that |T | ≤ ⌊ (⌊q⌋+1)
2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1, and GE [U ](M
′) > q where [[M ′]] =
T . Let T ′ = {((h, ℓ′), o) | (h, o) ∈ T}. Then, we have GE [U ](M ′′) > q where
[[M ′′]] = T ′. Finally, by Lemma 19, we have that for anyM ′ such that T ′ ⊆ [[M ′]],
M ′ 6∈ BGECC , and so BGECC is ⌊
(⌊q⌋+1)2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋+ 1-safety.
To see that BGECC is not k-safety for any k ≤ ⌊
(⌊q⌋+1)2
⌊q⌋+1−q ⌋, recall Theorem 5
that BGE [U ] is not k-safety for such k (even) for low-security-input-free pro-
grams. Therefore, the result follows by Lemma 3.
Theorem 14. (M, q) ∈ BBE1CC [h, ℓ] iff M(ℓ) is non-interferent.
Proof. We prove that if ∀µ.BE [〈µ, h, ℓ〉](M) ≤ q then M(ℓ) is non-interferent.
The other direction follows from Theorem 1. We prove the contraposition. Sup-
pose M(ℓ) is interferent, that is, there exist h0 and h1 such that M(h0, ℓ) 6=
M(h1, ℓ). If M(h, ℓ) 6=M(h1, ℓ), then let µ
′ be a distribution such that µ′(h1) =
1 − 1⌊2q⌋+1 . Otherwise, let µ
′ be a distribution such that µ′(h0) = 1 −
1
⌊2q⌋+1 .
Then, we have
BE [〈µ′, h, ℓ〉](M) ≥ log(⌊2q⌋+ 1) > q
Theorem 15. (M, q) ∈ BBE2CC iff M is non-interferent.
Proof. Straightforward from Theorem 14 and the fact that a programM is non-
interferent iff for all ℓ, M(ℓ) is non-interferent.
22 Therefore, for programs without low security inputs, this theorem follows from The-
orem 5. But, we show that the theorem holds also for programs with low security
inputs.
S(ψ) ≡
case (H ′, ψ,
−→
H )
when (true, true, ) then
−→
O :=
−−→
true;O′ := true;O′′ := true
when (true, false, ) then
−→
O :=
−→
H ;O′ := true;O′′ := false
when (false, ,
−−→
true) then
−→
O :=
−−→
true;O′ := false;O′′ := false
else
if H1
then
−→
O :=
−−→
true;O′ := true;O′′ := true
else
−→
O :=
−→
H ;O′ := false;O′′ := false
where H ′,
−→
H = H1, . . . , Hn, and O
′, O′′, O are distinct.
Fig. 3. The Boolean Program for Lemma 20 and Theorem 16.
Notation In the proofs below, for convenience, we sometimes use large letters
H , L, O, etc. to range over boolean variables as well as generic random variables.
Also, we assume that variablesH ,H ′,H1, etc. are high security boolean variables
and L, L′, Li, O, O1, Oi, etc. are low security boolean variables.
Majority SAT The following PP-hardness results (Theorems 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 23, and 24) are proven by a reduction from MAJSAT, which is a PP-complete
problem. MAJSAT is defined as follows.
MAJSAT = {φ | #SAT (φ) > 2n−1}
where n is the number of variables in the boolean formula φ, and #SAT (φ) is
the number of satisfying assignments of φ.
Lemma 20. Let
−→
H and H ′ be distinct boolean random variables. Let n and m
be any non-negative integers such that n ≤ 2|
−→
H | and m ≤ 2|
−→
H |. Let φm (resp. φn)
be a formula over
−→
H having m (resp. n) satisfying assignments. Then, n ≤ m iff
SE [U ](Mm) ≤ SE [U ](Mn). where Mn ≡ S(φn), Mm ≡ S(φm), and S is defined
in Figure 3.23
Proof. First, we explain the construction S(ψ) of Figure 3. Here, we use ML-like
case statements (i.e., earlier cases have the precedence). It is easy to see that
the case statements can be written as nested if-then-else statements. Note that
−→
O =
−−→
true, O′ = true, and O′′ = true iff either H ′∧ψ, or H ′∧H1 and at least one
of H2, . . . , Hn is false. For other inputs, S(ψ) returns disjoint outputs. Therefore,
the number of inputs h such that S(ψ)(h) =
−−→
true is #SAT (ψ)+ 2|
−→
H |−1− 1, and
for the rest of the 2|
−→
H |+1−(#SAT (ψ)+2|
−→
H|−1−1) inputs, S(ψ) returns disjoint
outputs different from
−−→
true.
23 The encoding S is defined so that MAJSAT is reduced to a bounding problem with
a rational upper-bound q in Theorem 16 below. A simpler encoding is possible if we
were to do a reduction with a non-rational q.
Therefore,
SE [U ](Mn) =
n+2x−1−1
2x+1 log
2x+1
n+2x−1−1 +
2x−n+2x−1+1
2x+1 log 2
x+1
SE [U ](Mm) =
m+2x−1−1
2x+1 log
2x+1
m+2x−1−1 +
2x−m+2x−1+1
2x+1 log 2
x+1
where x = |
−→
H |.
– ⇒
Suppose n ≤ m ≤ 2|
−→
H |. Let x = |
−→
H |, and let p and q be positive real numbers
such that p = n+2
x−1−1
2x+1 and q =
m+2x−1−1
2x+1 . We have 0 ≤ p ≤ q ≤
1
2 .
Therefore,
SE [U ](Mn)− SE [U ](Mm)
= p log 1
p
+ (1 − p) log 2x+1 − q log 1
q
− (1− q) log 2x+1
≥ p log( q
p
) + (q − p) log 2x+1
≥ 0
– ⇐
We prove the contraposition. Suppose m < n ≤ 2|
−→
H |. Let x = |
−→
H |, and let p
and q be positive real numbers such that p = n+2
x−1−1
2x+1 and q =
m+2x−1−1
2x+1 .
We have 0 ≤ q < p ≤ 12 . Therefore,
SE [U ](Mm)− SE [U ](Mn)
= log(1
q
)q + log pp + ((1− q)− (1− p)) log 2x+1
≥ log(1
q
)q + log pq + (p− q) log 2x+1
≥ (p− q) log 2x+1
> 0
Theorem 16. PP ⊆ BSE [U ]
Proof. Let φ be a boolean formula. Let ψ be a boolean formula such that
#SAT (ψ) = 2n−1 + 1 where n is the number of variables in φ. Let q be the
number such that
q = SE [U ](S(ψ))
= 2
n−1+1+2n−1−1
2n+1 log
2n+1
2n−1+1+2n−1−1 +
2n−(2n−1+1)+2n−1+1
2n+1 log 2
n+1
= 12 +
n+1
2
where S is defined in Figure 3. Then,
(S(φ), q) ∈ BSE [U ](S(φ)) iff SE [U ](S(φ)) ≤ SE [U ](S(ψ))
iff #SAT (φ) ≥ #SAT (ψ)
iff φ ∈MAJSAT
by Lemma 20. Therefore, we can decide if φ ∈MAJSAT by deciding if SE [U ](S(φ)) ≤
q. Note that the boolean program S(φ) and q can be constructed in time poly-
nomial in the size of φ. Therefore, this is a reduction from MAJSAT to BSE [U ].
T (φ) =
if φ ∨H ′
then Of := true;
−→
O :=
−−→
false
else Of := false;
−→
O :=
−→
H
where
−→
H and H ′ are distinct, and Of and
−→
O are distinct.
Fig. 4. The Boolean Program for Lemma 21, Lemma 22, and Theorem 17
Lemma 21. Let
−→
H and H ′ be distinct boolean variables. Let φ be a boolean
formula. Then, we have ME [U ](T (φ)) = log(#SAT (¬φ)+1) where T is defined
in Figure 4.
Proof. It is easy to see that the number of outputs of T (φ) is equal to the number
of satisfying assignment to ¬φ plus 1. Therefore, it follows from Lemma 12 that
ME [U ](T (φ)) = log(#SAT (¬φ) + 1).
Lemma 22. Let
−→
H and H ′ be distinct boolean random variables. Let m and n
be any non-negative integers such that m ≤ 2|
−→
H | and n ≤ 2|
−→
H |. Let φm (resp. φn)
be a formula over
−→
H having m (resp. n) satisfying assignments. Then, n ≤ m
iff ME [U ](Mm) ≤ ME [U ](Mn). where Mn ≡ T (φn), Mm ≡ T (φm), and T is
defined in Figure 4.
Proof. By Lemma 6, Lemma 7, and Lemma 21, we have ME [U ](T (φm)) ≤
ME [U ](T (φn))) iff log(2
|
−→
H | −m+ 1) ≤ log(2|
−→
H | − n+ 1) iff n ≤ m.
Theorem 17. PP ⊆ BME [U ]
Proof. Let φ be a boolean formula. Let ψ be a boolean formula such that
#SAT (ψ) = 2n−1 + 1 where n is the number of variables in φ. Let q be the
number such that
q = ME [U ](T (ψ)) = log(2n − (2n−1 + 1) + 1) = n− 1
where T is defined in Figure 4. Then, we have
ME [U ](T (φ)) ≤ q iff ME [U ](T (φ)) ≤ ME [U ](T (ψ))
iff φ ∈ MAJSAT
by Lemma 22. Therefore, we can decide if φ ∈MAJSAT by deciding ifME [U ](T (φ)) ≤
q. Note that T (φ) and q can be constructed in time polynomial in the size of φ.
Therefore, this is a reduction from MAJSAT to BME [U ].
Definition 19. Let M be a function such that M : A → B. For any o ∈ B, we
write M−1(o) to mean
M−1(o) = {i ∈ A | o =M(i)}
Lemma 23. Let
−→
H and H ′ be distinct boolean random variables. Let n and m
be non-negative integers such that n ≤ 2|
−→
H | and m ≤ 2|
−→
H |. Let φm (resp. φn) be
a formula over
−→
H having m (resp. n) satisfying assignments. Then, m ≤ n iff
GE [U ](Mn) ≤ GE [U ](Mm). whereMn ≡ O := φn∨H
′ andMm ≡ O := φm∨H
′.
Proof. By the definition,
GE [U ](M) = G(H)− G(H |O)
= 12 (2
|H|+1) + 12 −
∑
o
∑
1≤i≤|H| iU(hi, o)
= 2|H| − 1
2|H|+2
(|M−1(true)|2 + |M−1(false)|2)
Therefore, we have
GE [U ](Mn) ≤ GE [U ](Mm)
iff
|M−1m (true)|
2 + |M−1m (false)|
2 ≤ |M−1n (true)|
2 + |M−1n (false)|
2
iff m ≤ n.
Theorem 18. PP ⊆ BGE [U ]
Proof. Let φ be a boolean formula. Let ψ be a boolean formula such that
#SAT (ψ) = 2n−1 + 1 where n is the number of variables in φ. Let q be the
number such that
q = GE (O := ψ ∨H)
= 2
n+1
2 −
1
2n+2 (|M
−1(true)|2 + |M−1(false)|2)
= 2n − 12n+2 ((2
n−1 + 1)2 + (2n−1 − 1)2)
where H is a boolean variable that does not appear in ψ and φ. Then, we have
GE [U ](O := φ ∨H) ≤ q iff GE [U ](O := φ ∨H) ≤ GE [U ](O := ψ ∨H)
iff GE [U ](O := φ ∨H) ≤ q
iff #SAT (φ) ≥ #SAT (ψ)
iff φ ∈MAJSAT
by Lemma 23. Therefore, we can decide if φ ∈MAJSAT by deciding ifGE [U ](O :=
φ∨H) ≤ q. Note that O := φ ∨H and q can be constructed in time polynomial
in the size of φ. Therefore, this is a reduction from MAJSAT to BGE [U ].
Theorem 19. PP ⊆ BCC
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 6 and Theorem 17.
Lemma 24. Let
−→
H , H ′, and H ′′ be distinct boolean random variables. Let n
and m be any non-negative integers such that n ≤ 2|
−→
H | and m ≤ 2|
−→
H |. Let φm
(resp. φn) be a formula over
−→
H having m (resp. n) satisfying assignments. Then,
n ≤ m iff maxh BE [〈U, h〉](Mm) ≤ maxh BE [〈U, h〉](Mn), where Mn ≡ V (ψn),
Mm ≡ V (φm), and V is defined in Figure 5.
24
24 As in Lemma 20, the encoding is chosen so as to reduce MAJSAT to the bounding
problem with a rational upper-bound.
V (ψ) ≡
case (H ′, H ′′,
−→
H )
when (true, true, ) then
if ψ then O := true else O := false
when (true, false,
−−→
true) then O := false
when (true, false, ) then
if H1 then O := true else O := false
else O := false
where
−→
H = H1, . . . , Hh is the vector of variables appearing in ψ, and
−→
H , H ′,
and H ′′ are distinct.
Fig. 5. The Boolean Program for Lemma 24, Theorem 20, and Theorem 21.
Proof. First, we explain the construction V (ψ) of Figure 5. Note that V (ψ) =
true iff eitherH ′∧H ′′∧ψ, orH ′∧¬H ′′∧H1 and at least one ofH2, . . . , Hn is false.
Therefore, there are strictly more inputs h such that V (ψ)(h) = false than inputs
h such that V (ψ)(h) = true. Hence, maxhBE [〈U, h〉](V (ψ)) = BE [〈U, h
′〉](V (ψ))
where h′ is any input such that V (ψ)(h′) = true.
Now, let x = |
−→
H |. Then,
maxh BE [〈U, h〉](Mn) = log
2x+2
n+2x−1−1
maxh BE [〈U, h〉](Mm) = log
2x+2
m+2x−1−1
Therefore, n ≤ m iff maxh BE [〈U, h〉](Mm) ≤ maxh BE [〈U, h〉](Mn).
Theorem 20. PP ⊆ BBE1 [〈U, h, ℓ〉]
Proof. Let φ be a boolean formula. Let ψ be a boolean formula such that
#SAT (ψ) = 2n−1 + 1 where n is the number of variables in φ. Let q be the
number such that
q = BE [〈U, h〉](V (ψ)) = log
2n+2
2n−1 + 1 + 2n−1 − 1
= 2
where V is defined in Figure 5, h is a high security input such that h(H ′) = true,
h(H ′′) = false, h(H1) = true, and h(H2) = false. Note that V (ψ)(h) = V (φ)(h) =
true. Then, we have
(V (φ), q) ∈ BBE1 [〈U, h〉] iff maxh′ BE [〈U, h
′〉](V (φ)) ≤ q
iff maxh′ BE [〈U, h
′〉](V (φ))
≤ maxh′ BE [〈U, h
′〉](V (ψ))
iff #SAT (φ) ≥ #SAT (ψ)
iff φ ∈MAJSAT
by Lemma 24, and the fact that maxh′ BE [〈U, h
′〉](V (φ)) = BE [〈U, h〉](V (φ))
and maxh′ BE [〈U, h
′〉](V (ψ)) = BE [〈U, h〉](V (ψ)). Therefore, we can decide if
φ ∈ MAJSAT by deciding if BE [〈U, h〉](V (φ)) ≤ q. Note that V (φ) and q can
be constructed in time polynomial in the size of φ (in fact, q is just the constant
2). Therefore, this is a reduction from MAJSAT to BBE1 [〈U, h〉].
Theorem 21. PP ⊆ BBE2 [U ]
Proof. Let φ be a boolean formula. Let ψ be a boolean formula such that
#SAT (ψ) = 2n−1 + 1 where n is the number of variables in φ. Let q be the
number such that
q = max
h
BE [〈U, h〉](V (ψ)) = log
2n+2
2n−1 + 1 + 2n−1 − 1
= 2
where V is defined in Figure 5. We have
(V (φ), q) ∈ BBE2 [U ] iff maxhBE [〈U, h〉](V (φ)) ≤ q
iff maxhBE [〈U, h〉](V (φ)) ≤ maxh BE [〈U, h〉](V (ψ))
iff #SAT (φ) ≥ #SAT (ψ)
iff φ ∈MAJSAT
by Lemma 24. Therefore, we can decide if φ ∈MAJSAT by deciding if maxh BE [〈U, h〉](V (φ)) ≤
q. Note that V (φ) and q can be constructed in time polynomial in the size of φ
(in fact, q is just the constant 2). Therefore, this is a reduction from MAJSAT
to BBE2 [U ].
Theorem 22. PP ⊆ BSECC
Proof. Trivial from Theorem 19 and the fact that BSECC is equivalent to BCC .
Theorem 23. PP ⊆ BMECC
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 2 and Theorem 19.
Theorem 24. PP ⊆ BGECC
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 3 and Theorem 18.
We have shown in a previous work [32] that checking non-interference for
loop-free boolean programs is coNP-complete.
Lemma 25. Checking non-interference is coNP-complete for loop-free boolean
programs.
Theorem 25. BBE1CC [h, ℓ] is coNP-complete.
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 25 and Theorem 14.
Theorem 26. BBE2CC is coNP-complete.
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 25 and Theorem 15.
